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Abstract
This report investigates the impacts that would result from an overhaul of passenger car
taxation so that taxes would be based exclusively on car use. In practice this would mean
substituting fixed taxes (the motor car tax and annual vehicle tax) with taxes based on
kilometres driven.
The kilometre tax would be a more flexible transport policy tool than the current tax system.
It would also better serve the achievement of transport and environmental policy objectives
than the existing tax regime. On the other hand the kilometre-based system would be less
cost effective. The estimated impact of taxing motorists based on kilometres driven lends
support to a possible move towards the introduction of a kilometre tax in Finland.
Before any final decisions are taken it is crucial to ensure that the necessary technology works
as intended and that it is suited to taxation purposes; that the cost estimates are accurate;
and that privacy protection is maintained. The Working Group recommends a step-by-step
approach through trials and experiments. The first stage should involve extensive testing of
technical systems, information security and monitoring methods.
1To the Ministry of Transport and Communications
The Ministry of Transport and Communications appointed on 3 February 2012 a
Working Group to explore ways of moving towards a fairer and smarter transport
system and to study different long-term strategies for the introduction of road
pricing systems. The Working Group’s mandate is based on the Government
Programme which says that the Government will assess the feasibility of
introducing GPS-based road pricing systems in Finland.
The Working Group has considered the motives, international experiences,
legislative issues, technical solutions and the impacts of road pricing. It has
focused primarily on the effects of a kilometre-based tax on passenger cars.
Digitalisation is eventually and inevitably going to make a major impact on
transport. Advancing technology and the growth of smart transport provide an
opportunity to move towards a fairer system of road transport taxation that is
based on vehicle use. In this situation it is advisable to align and integrate
transport policy objectives with the objectives of road taxation.
A kilometre tax would better serve the achievement of transport and
environmental policy objectives than the existing tax regime. The kilometre-
based system would be less cost effective than the current method, but the
annual savings in reduced accident and emission costs to society would be equal
to the costs of collecting the kilometre tax.
Legislative considerations pose no obstacles to the development of a
comprehensive national road pricing system. There are, however, several
significant legislative boundary conditions for the implementation of such a
system. Privacy protection is just one of the considerations that must be resolved
from the very outset in developing a kilometre-based tax system.
The estimated impacts of taxing motorists based on kilometres driven lends
support to a possible move in motoring taxation towards the introduction of a
kilometre tax in Finland. Overhauling the road tax system to make the amount of
tax payable entirely dependent on car use is a major public issue that involves a
number of challenges and uncertainties.
Before  any  final  decisions  are  taken  on  the  adoption  of  a  kilometre  tax  it  is
crucial to ensure that the necessary technology works as intended and that it is
suited to taxation purposes; that the cost estimates are accurate; and that
privacy protection is maintained. It is advisable to proceed through trials and
2experiments. The first stage should involve extensive testing of technical
systems, information security and monitoring methods. The early introduction of
a kilometre-based tax might contribute to create new business opportunities and
jobs in Finnish industry.
The Working Group hereby submits its unanimous Final Report to the Ministry of
Transport and Communications. A statement is attached to the Final Report
(Annex 1).
Helsinki, 16 December 2013
Jorma Ollila
Chairman of the Working Group
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41. Introduction
1.1 Working Group’s mandate
Minister of Transport, Ms Merja Kyllönen appointed on 3 February 2012 a Working Group
tasked with exploring how Finland could move towards a fairer and smarter transport
system and with studying different long-term strategies for the introduction of road
pricing systems. The Working Group’s mandate is based on the Government Programme,
which says that the Government will assess the feasibility of introducing GPS-based road
pricing systems in Finland.
The Working Group’s aim was to provide an overview of how Finland should proceed with
the introduction of road pricing in the long term, addressing the technical, transport,
economic and legislative issues. Specifically, the Working Group’s mandate was to
provide an assessment of
1. International experiences of road pricing and current trends
2. What kinds of road pricing objectives should be adopted in Finland
3. What kinds of technical solutions would be viable in Finland
4. The impacts of road pricing
5. In what way and over what sort of time scale would Finland be able to
adopt a GPS-based road pricing system
6. What effects would a road pricing system have on road users’ privacy
protection and what kind of legislative changes would be needed
7. What other electronic services could be provided based on the GPS-based
road pricing system
8. What are the key areas of development and export prospects for Finnish
GPS technology and services based on GPS applications
The current Final Report summarises the discussions and work of the Working Group.
Separate reports are published on technical and legislative issues as well as on the
impacts of introducing a road pricing system.
Chapter 2 of this report discusses the background and reasons why an overhaul of the
current tax system is being considered. Chapter 3 describes the existing system.
Chapters 4 and 5 report on international experiences of road pricing and discuss the
objectives and motives for road pricing/taxes in Finland. Chapter 6 deals with legislative
issues. The specific options considered and impact assessments are introduced in
Chapter 7. The Working Group’s conclusions are presented in Chapter 8.
1.2 Notes on terminology
Road pricing is traditionally used to refer to a toll collected for the use of a specific road
or part of a road network. Motorway tolls in many European countries are an example of
road pricing where motorists pay extra in addition to existing taxes.
Road pricing is also an integral part of so-called transport pricing, which comprises the
entire system of road-related taxes and charges. In Finland, the Constitutional Law
Committee has previously taken the view that any road pricing collected in Finland would
constitutionally be a tax payment, which is why in the Finnish context it is more
appropriate to refer not to congestion charges or other similar fees or tolls, but to road
taxes. Nonetheless the report frequently refers to the well-established concepts of
congestion charges and tolls, although in the Finnish context they always mean taxes.
This report is mainly interested to assess the effects of introducing a national kilometre
tax levied on passenger cars. In order to properly quantify these effects, the calculations
proceed from the premise that existing fixed taxes on passenger cars, the amount of
which is not dependent on distances driven, would be replaced by kilometre taxes. Fixed
taxes, in this connection, refer to the car tax, the base component of the annual vehicle
5tax, and the vehicle motive force tax. Therefore a national kilometre tax would not be a
traditional road pricing scheme comparable to a congestion charge that is levied in
addition to existing taxes. In practice the tax reform would mean changing the existing
system of passenger car taxation with a new tax system that is based entirely on taxing
motorists based on vehicle use (fuel tax + kilometre tax). For this reason it is more
accurate to refer not to road pricing, but rather to the taxation of car use. The Working
Group is keen to stress that no decisions have been made on discontinuing or changing
existing taxes, but all the figures presented are based on theoretical calculations made
for the purposes of this report.
62. Why consider changing the existing tax system?
2.1 Need for more effective transport policy
The existing road tax regime was not originally intended as a transport policy tool, but
rather as a means of generating tax revenue for the government. However road taxation
could also serve as an effective transport policy tool that could help to direct the use of
the transport system for greater efficiency, to reduce the negative externalities of traffic,
and to finance the development and maintenance of the transport system. In other words
it might be possible by means of economic regulation to influence the volume and quality
of road traffic.
Economists have long advocated the introduction of transport pricing. The thinking in
economics is that users should pay for all the costs incurred to themselves and to others
from the use of the transport infrastructure (road network wear and tear, time costs,
environmental costs, or the so-called socio-economic marginal costs). This will have the
effect of increasing the efficiency of road network use, reducing the costs of transport
and maximising the benefits to society. In practice, then, it is thought that transport
pricing makes for greater transparency in decision-making on the demand side of
transport infrastructure capacity: users will have greater influence over their own
transport costs by adjusting their behaviour. At the same time there would be a real
incentive for users to take account of the negative externalities of transport in their own
decision-making. Overall the system would work more effectively than it does at the
moment, and it would have a greater guidance effect on people’s behaviour.
A good example is provided by congestion. Traditionally, congestion is viewed as an
infrastructure issue, i.e. as a problem on the supply side. The solution is thought to lie in
increasing the road network capacity. Economics, however, views this as a pricing issue,
as a problem on the demand side. The solution, accordingly, lies in pricing. Congestion
can be resolved by imposing a charge on the use of congested roads during rush hours.
This will reduce transport flows enough to get the traffic going again, because some
drivers will decide to take public transport, some will choose a different route or make
their journey at a different time.
The negative externalities of transport (congestion, emissions, etc.) have increased. In
Finland, for instance, the transport sector looks set to achieve its 2020 emission
reduction targets, but not in the longer term. Transport service requirements are
becoming increasingly rigorous, and the targets for mitigating the negative effects of
transport are getting ever tougher. If the transport system is to meet the complex mix of
objectives that include delivering 24/7 reliability and satisfying a broad spectrum of user
needs in absolute safety and at once in a cost efficient and environmentally friendly
manner, then it must also have access to a more diverse selection of tools.
The growth of transport also calls for more effective means to influence people’s
transport choices and behaviour. Finland’s road network is by and large sufficient to meet
current and future transport needs, but there are some issues with regard to directing
transport flows so that the existing network can be used more effectively. It is necessary
to shift the focus of transport policy so that capacity problems are resolved primarily by
means of controlling transport flows and demand rather than building new infrastructure.
These means are often much more cost effective than traditional means of infrastructure
management, and therefore contribute to easing the pressure on state finances, a key
consideration in present-day decision-making on infrastructure management.
Transport pricing is an integral part of EU transport policy. In 2011 the European
Commission published the EU Transport White Paper in which it proposed that the
structure of transport fees and taxes should move towards the full application of the
”polluter pays” and ”user pays” principles. The EU’s long-term goal is to apply user fees
to all vehicles and on the whole network to reflect at least the maintenance cost of
infrastructure, congestion, air and noise pollution.
7Several countries are currently in the process of rethinking the taxation of road
transport. There are several reasons for this, and they tend to be very similar in every
case.
The key motive for taxing road transport has always been to raise tax revenue for the
government. Collecting taxes from transport has been a relatively simple and
straightforward task for administration, and the continued growth of road transport has
brought a steady growth of tax revenues. In recent years, however, this trend has
changed with significant improvements in fuel efficiency, for instance, chiefly as a result
of increasing environmental concerns. In the longer term, the growth of transport can no
longer guarantee the current level of revenues from fuel taxes. There are two
alternatives: either to continue to put up taxes, or to overhaul the tax system.
The discussion has revolved around two principal options, viz. collecting separate road
charges or introducing a kilometre-based tax system where drivers are taxed based on
kilometres driven. There is very little annual variation in the total number of kilometres
driven on the road, and therefore it is easy to predict the amount of annual tax revenue.
The interest in the kilometre system has been strongest in countries where revenue from
the fuel tax goes directly back into road network maintenance. The United States is a
case in point. The continued improvement in car fuel efficiency has meant that despite
the growth of transport, revenue from fuel taxes has fallen clearly and consequently less
money has been available for road maintenance. Several states in the US are therefore
discussing plans to replace the fuel tax with a mileage tax.
In Europe, too, there has been growing interest in the kilometre tax. Several European
countries have now introduced a kilometre tax on heavy goods traffic. However in Europe
the kilometre tax is not seen as a replacement of fuel tax, but rather as a complement.
This is because raising fuel taxes is politically less contentious in Europe than in the
United States. Furthermore in the EU, abandoning the fuel tax would require a
unanimous decision by all Member States, and such a decision is not forthcoming at this
time.
The European discussion is framed by the premise that the kilometre tax would be
introduced in replacement of fixed taxes on road transport, i.e. the annual vehicle tax or
taxes associated with purchasing a new car. This is based on the recognition that variable
taxes, i.e. taxes dependent on the amount driven, have a much greater influence on
people’s transport behaviour than fixed taxes. Therefore a key reason for overhauling the
road tax system is firmly grounded in transport policy.
2.2 Digitalisation and technology are changing transport
Several sectors of society have seen a rising wave of digitalisation in recent years that
has led to increasing productivity and brought new products and services into the
marketplace. The same trend of digitalisation is inevitably going to make a major impact
on the transport sector as well. Intelligent transport systems and services (ITS) is one
way of addressing the problems created by the growing volume of road transport.
Significant improvements have been achieved in traffic flows and traffic safety by means
of traffic management and particularly variable traffic controls (traffic lights, variable
speed limits, etc.). Ongoing advances in ICTs are creating whole new vistas for the
entertainment and benefit of road users. Among these technological advances, special
mention must be made of the development of a ”transport internet”, which is based on
the proliferation of mobile broadband, mobile terminals and GPS and navigation services.
The private sector has also invested heavily in developing smart on-board systems and in
intelligent traffic and transport systems. These technological innovations are also paving
the way to a rethinking of transport pricing systems.
The most useful services with respect to traffic fluency and safety are so-called
collaborative services in which vehicles, road users and the transport infrastructure are
engaged in mutual dialogue to prevent accidents from happening by means of warnings,
8emergency brake systems and other mechanisms. In the haulage industry, key services
include those designed to increase the efficiency of rolling stock use and order-delivery
chain management in general, starting from vehicle and cargo monitoring services to
various control books and electronic transport documents.
Another significant technological development is the evolution of more advanced driver
assistance systems, which are bring us ever closer to automatic driving cars. Anti-lock
braking systems, active lane assistance, variable cruise control and electronic stability
control are all in existing use in cars today. Autonomous cars will be in the marketplace
by 2020, and fully automatic, self-driving cars will be on the road after 2025. It is
expected that the latter will bring significant relief to congestion problems by allowing
larger numbers of vehicles to occupy the same road space and at the same time by
providing revolutionary new opportunities for the ”transport as service” concept. It is
clear then that transport will become increasingly pervaded by information technology. At
the same time it is logical that transport pricing (taxation) will become an integral part of
this modern system. Furthermore, ongoing advances in technology will continue to open
up new ways of levying transport taxes. So sophisticated is today’s positioning
technology that it is already possible to levy taxes based on time and place.
In  the  long  term  the  advanced  technologies  and  solutions  discussed  above  will  indeed
allow for the ”traffic as a service” concept to materialise. The core of this traffic-as-a-
service thinking1 lies  in  the  effective  and  user-friendly  coordination  and  integration  of
intelligent transport infrastructure, transport services and transport-related information
and other services. The vision might be one of a system where users get the transport
services they need by building a package that meets their specific transport needs: this
might include using their own car, using taxi and public transport services, parking
services as well as other additional services. This requires that boundaries between
different transport modes are lowered, that transport pricing is further developed and
that information services are put to more effective use.
1 Traffic as a Service, TaaS; or Mobility as a Service, MaaS.
93. Finland’s existing road tax system
3.1 Different types of taxes
Finland’s existing road tax system is based on three different taxes. First, a car tax is
levied on all new cars purchased as well as on second-hand cars imported into Finland.
Second, an annual vehicle tax is levied on all vehicles in current use. And third, a fuel tax
is levied based on the amount of fuel consumption.
Car tax
Car tax is a one-off tax levied in connection with the first registration for road use of a
new car or motorcycle purchased in Finland or a second-hand car or motorcycle imported
into Finland.2 The amount of tax is based on the value of the car: it is determined
according to the consumer price of the car in Finland. In connection with the 2008 tax
reform the flat tax rate was replaced by a tiered system to reflect the car’s carbon
dioxide emission performance. The emissions-based tax regime was further tightened in
2012. Average emission levels of new cars have fallen by more than one-third since the
introduction of the new tax rules.
Car tax is levied on newly registered passenger cars and vans as a percentage of their
value for tax purposes. The tax rate varies according to the vehicle’s carbon dioxide
emission performance. The lowest rate is 5% for zero emissions (0g CO2/km), rising
progressively in one gram increments to 360g CO2/km, which attracts a tax rate of
50%.3 Vans used for goods transport and distribution attract a reduced tax rate. For
motorcycles, the car tax is levied based on the engine’s cubic capacity: the minimum tax
rate is 9.8% and the maximum rate 24.4% of the motorcycle’s taxable value. Taxable
value, then, is determined based on the domestic retail value of the vehicle in question.
Second-hand cars, vans and motorcycles imported into Finland and registered for road
use are taxed on the same basis as new cars: their taxable value is determined based on
their domestic retail value.
Vehicle tax and vehicle motive force tax
Vehicle tax and vehicle motive force tax are taxes related to the availability of the vehicle
for road use. The base tax component of the vehicle tax is levied on all passenger cars
and vans in regular road use in Finland; in addition the motive force tax is levied on
passenger cars, vans and lorries that are powered by other than petrol engines. Both
these taxes are levied for each day that the vehicles are registered for regular road use.
As it stands the base tax component of the vehicle tax has some incentive effect for
consumers to shift to lower emissions vehicles through the tiered emissions regulations.
The incentive effect of the base tax complements the corresponding mechanism built into
the car tax.
Vehicle tax was originally a flat rate tax applied to all passenger cars and vans
irrespective of their size and performance. From the beginning of 2010 the base tax
component of the vehicle tax has been based on the carbon dioxide emissions of cars and
vans. For cars whose specific emissions are not indicated in the type-approval
information for the vehicle in question, the base tax is determined according to the
vehicle’s total mass. In 2013 the minimum emissions-based vehicle tax was 43.07€ / 365
days (11.8 cents/day at 0 g/km emissions; in practice this is for electric cars) and the
maximum 606.27€/ 365 days (166.1 cents/day). The lowest vehicle tax calculated on the
basis of total mass is 125.93€ / 365 days (34.5 cents/day; total mass up to 1,300 kg)
and the highest 535.46 €/365 days (146.7 cents/day; total mass 3,401–3,500 kg).
2 Car tax is not levied on heavy goods vehicles or on buses or coaches; nor on taxis, caravans and motor homes,
emergency vehicles, ambulances, hearses and veterinary vehicles; nor on mopeds and lightweight ATVs.
3 Specific emission is indicated in the vehicle’s type-approval information. In cases where emission data are
missing, the figure is derived based on the vehicle’s total mass.
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Car tax 1 304 1 217 1 016 687 941 1 068 1 007
Annual vehicle tax 567 612 637 654 691 759 758
base tax 327 347 456 434
tax on driving power 327 344 303 324
Fuel tax for fuel consumed in road transport:
petrol 1 424 1 443 1 453 1 435 1 408 1 334 1 311
diesel 768 833 943 929 1 007 1 038 1 260
VAT on fuel * 994 996 1 122 1 008 1 191 1 400 1 508
Totall 5 057 5 101 5 171 4 713 5 238 5 599 5 844
* Around 40-50% of estimated VAT sum is deductible
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
Tax
Motive force tax is levied on passenger cars on fiscal grounds to even out the differences
between the lower-taxed diesel fuel and higher-taxed petrol based on the annual total of
kilometres driven. The tax therefore has the role of balancing out the fuel tax. In
connection with the fuel tax reform the motive force tax levied on passenger cars was
graded by type of motive force to add to its environmental regulation effect: the tax now
takes account of the energy and carbon content and the local emissions of each energy
source. The motive force tax levied on HGVs is not a ”balancing tax”, but intended to
meet the requirements of the Euro-vignette directive for a minimum time-based tax on
HGVs. The motive force tax charged on HGVs is 0.6–2.2 cents/day for every 100
kilogrammes depending on whether the truck is used for drawing a trailer as well as on
the type of trailer (full trailer or semi-trailer). The tax can be determined on a daily basis
in cases where a vehicle is temporarily withdrawn from road use or if its status as a
drawing/non-drawing truck changes.
Fuel tax
Based on the idea of directly taxing vehicle use, fuel tax has a long history of fiscal
motivation, but in recent years energy and environmental regulation have come to figure
ever more prominently. Fuel tax is based on the energy content of each fuel and its
lifetime carbon dioxide emissions and local emissions, which is why the per-litre taxes on
biofuels and biogas are lower than those levied on fossil fuels. Fuels that work in diesel
engines attract a lower tax than petrol products. This has been in order to prevent the
costs of diesel-powered goods transport from escalating.
3.2 Government tax revenue from transport
Table 1. Total annual revenue from road taxes (EUR million)
Road transport and passenger car transport in particular has long been a very significant
source of tax revenue for the Finnish government. Road taxes have accounted for some
15% of total government tax revenue. It is extremely difficult to replace these taxes
from any other sources. It is clear then that any undertaking to overhaul the road tax
system must closely consider the effects of such a reform on government tax revenue.
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4. Road pricing schemes around the world
4.1 Historical motives: funding and transit
Road pricing mechanisms are often called tolls. This is understandable from an historical
point of view, as tolls have always been collected on different parts of transport
networks. Tolls were charged to people and goods transiting a certain area. However this
is not entirely the same as the modern understanding of road pricing in that early tolls
were not charged to the vehicle used, nor was the revenue from tolls used to fund road
and infrastructure maintenance or to try and influence transport volumes. The key
motive was simply to collect money from transit. Even today this remains one of the
most important motives behind road pricing.
Road pricing charges have always been integrally related to financing the building and
maintenance of roads. Modern practice whereby governments assume the costs of road
maintenance is, historically speaking, a rather recent innovation that only began to gain
ground from the mid-1850s. Prior to this the building and maintenance of roads was
usually down to local residents and towns that benefited from their existence. However
practices varied widely from country to country.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the UK and the United States had several turnpike toll
roads.4 These toll roads were intended to ensure that monies were available to build and
maintain new roads. However they were not particularly profitable and were gradually
abandoned by the early 20th century.
The second wave of toll roads came after the Second World War when France, Spain and
Italy set about building an extensive network of toll motorways. Building was usually
based on the concession principle. The motive was fundamentally the same as with the
early turnpike toll roads: to collect the money needed to build and maintain roads
without having to resort to public funds. In France, for instance, the government gave
private companies or public-private partnerships the right to build, finance and operate
motorways and to charge tolls for the use of these roads. Even today, new toll roads are
being built and opened in different parts of the world. In Europe alone, there are
currently some 45,000 kilometres of tolled roads.
4.2 Collecting transit charges
The two principal motives for road pricing, funding and transit, have continued to gain in
prominence since the mid-1990s. Several European countries have introduced road
pricing for HGVs. However these schemes have been motivated by other goals as well,
such as exercising a positive environmental impact, influencing the division of labour
between different transport modes, improving transport efficiency and ensuring equitable
treatment of domestic and foreign HGV transport. One of the reasons behind the growth
of HGV road pricing in Europe has been the introduction of relevant legislation: the Euro-
vignette directive took effect in 1999. Currently the only EU countries that do not have
HGV road pricing schemes in place are Finland, Estonia and Cyprus.
The most common HGV road pricing system in use in the vignette, which is a time-based
charge. Vignettes can be purchased for a day, week, month or year. The so-called Euro-
vignette was introduced in 1995 in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Sweden and Germany. Several other countries also have national vignettes.
The vignette system is gradually giving way to an HGV kilometre charge. This trend is
mainly being driven by Central European countries, which have high volumes of HGV
transit. The view taken in these countries is that foreign HGV traffic should also
contribute towards the costs of maintaining the road network. Switzerland introduced an
4 The “turnpike” was a pole that barred movement along a road. When the traveller paid the required fee, the
pike was moved out of the way.
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HGV kilometre fee in 2001, and Austria, Germany, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have
introduced a corresponding fee that is mainly applicable to motorways. France will be
introducing an HGV kilometre fee in 2014. These moves are motivated not only by
funding, but also environmental considerations. Therefore the fees are called eco-taxes.
In addition to the countries just listed, a number of EU Member States have plans in
place to introduce an HGV kilometre fee.
The impacts of these HGV road pricing schemes have been in line with the objectives set.
They have influenced both the volume of transport and the quality of HGVs on the road.
However the division of labour between different transport modes has remained
unaffected: there has been no modal shift from road to rail transport. The kilometre fees
have generated additional revenues for the governments concerned. In Germany, annual
revenues from HGV kilometre fees come to around EUR 3.5 billion, 10 times more than it
collected in Euro-vignette fees. The costs of running the road pricing system in Germany
have been around 15% of gross revenue.
4.3 Controlling transport demand
Apart from the funding motive, another justification for transport pricing that has
recently gained increasing prominence is the need to control transport demand. In urban
areas one way of controlling transport demand is through the introduction of congestion
charges. By charging a fee for driving a car at a certain time in a certain place it is
possible to reduce the volume of traffic. The purpose is to create enough space to get the
traffic moving again. Some drivers will decide to take public transport, some will choose
a different route or make their journey at a different time. There are different types of
congestion charges, including toll rings (payable upon entering and/or leaving a certain
zone), area tolls (payable for driving within a certain area) and kilometres charges, which
are payable in certain areas or on certain roads. The latter system has not yet been put
into practice anywhere.
Congestion pricing is not in fact an accurate concept inasmuch as drivers are not paying
for the congestion, but for the fluency of traffic. Indeed it has often been suggested that
the term congestion charge should be revised accordingly.
Congestion pricing is not usually intended simply to make the transport system more
efficient and to make the traffic flow better, but also to reduce the adverse
environmental impacts of transport (e.g. curbing CO2 emissions) and to gain additional
financing for the transport system.
The increased use of congestion pricing is in part attributable to advances in technology.
Modern technology makes it possible for traffic to flow readily without the need to stop at
toll collection points. At the same time this technology means the actual charge can be
varied at different times or in different places.
The best-known examples of congestion pricing are Singapore, London and Stockholm.
All these cities have used congestion charges in order to reduce volumes of car traffic
during rush hours. The results have been largely consistent: there have been fewer
gridlocks and overall traffic has flowed more easily. These successes have attracted
growing interest in the use of road pricing as a means of transport control, and many
cities have looked into the possibility of introducing such schemes. Gothenburg in
Sweden introduced congestion pricing from the beginning of 2013. Again the impact has
been similar to that seen elsewhere.
The effects of congestion charges on transport have been quite clear and in line with the
targets set. In this context of congestion pricing there has been much talk about the
fairness of these schemes, particularly about whether low income groups are at a
disadvantage.
Research results have shown that the perceived fairness of congestion pricing depends
on how the charges are compensated and on how revenues from congestion schemes are
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spent. The effect of congestion pricing and any associated compensation system may be
either regressive or progressive. A tax is regressive if people with a low income pay a
larger share of their income in taxes than people with a high income. In other words the
amount of tax as a proportion of income grows smaller with rising income. A tax is
progressive, on the other hand, if the tax rate increases with rising income. Progressive
taxation is generally considered fair, regressive taxation unfair.
London and Stockholm have used revenues from congestion pricing to increase and
improve public transport. Evidence from opinion surveys suggests that the overall impact
of congestion charges and compensation systems in both these cities is generally
considered progressive rather than regressive. This is because low income groups use
public transport more than high income groups. A survey in Sweden found that if
revenue from congestion pricing is used to improve public transport, women and lower
income groups stand to benefit the most (progressive effect). If, on the other hand, the
revenue were used to reduce taxes, high income groups would be the main beneficiaries
(regressive effect).5 In Singapore, too, the overall impact of congestion pricing is
considered progressive because there the revenue has been spent on improving public
transport and on building affordable housing particularly along public transport corridors.
In Norway, revenue from road tolls goes towards both road infrastructure investment and
improving public transport.
Another comment often made about congestion charging is that it has an adverse effect
on local business among other things by discouraging people from driving into city
centres. However there is no evidence to support this in any of the cities that have
congestion charges in place. On the contrary figures from London indicate that the
number of trips made into the congestion charge area has increased every year since the
system was introduced.6
4.4 National kilometre charge
Road pricing systems in different countries have so far been limited to specific areas.
Universal or near-universal charges or taxes applicable to the whole or the major part of
the road network are only used for HGV traffic. There are no such tolls or taxes anywhere
for passenger cars (excluding the time-based vignette payment). Nevertheless it seems
that this is now the prevailing trend: we are headed towards road pricing charges or
taxes that apply to the whole road network. There are several reasons for this.
One key reason is the development of technology, which has become so sophisticated
that it is possible to have different tax rates for car use at different times or in different
places. As was discussed earlier, the EU’s long-term transport policy objective is to have
road pricing charges that are applicable to all vehicles across the road network. The
existing road tax system does not yet allow for any significant regional differentiation.
The kilometre tax is considered one of the possible ways of influencing transport costs in
different areas, because it is technically possible to have different kilometre tax rates in
different areas.
In 2013 the US state of Oregon adopted a law that paves the way to the introduction of a
state-wide mileage tax system for passenger cars. The system will be put in place from
the beginning of 2015, when 5,000 voluntary motorists will start paying the mileage tax.
In return, they will be exempted from fuel tax (i.e. the tax will be paid back to them).
State officials in Oregon are keen to stress that this is no longer just a trial, but the
beginning of an alternative way to paying taxes for driving. The plan is to gradually
replace the fuel tax with the mileage tax.
5 Eliasson, Jonas, Mattsson, Lars-Göran, (2006). Equity Effects of Congestion Pricing: Quantitative
Methodology and a Case Study for Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Volume 40,
Issue 7, pp 602-620.
6 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/corporate/travel-in-london-report-4.pdf
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In autumn 2013, in connection with discussions on the formation of a new German
government, the decision was taken to introduce a national autobahn charge for
passenger cars. At least initially the charge will be collected in the form of an annual
vignette. Authorities in Germany have already looked into the possibility of extending the
current HGV kilometre charge to apply to passenger cars as well.
The spread of road pricing has also been taken into account in European legislation.
Under the unifying European Electronic Toll Services (EETS) system, road users need
only one on-board unit and one contract with a service provider to be able to pay all road
tolls in the countries joining the system. Supplied by the EETS service provider, the
necessary on-board unit collects information on the vehicle’s movements in EETS
domains. Users can pay the service provider for their road tolls on a single invoice. The
toll can be collected in the form of a fee, tax or other dues. The service provider will be
responsible for making payment on behalf of the EETS user to all road toll operators in
whose domains the vehicle has been used. The service provider can use the same on-
board unit to deliver other services needed by road users, such as real-time information
on traffic and road conditions.
EETS is designed to facilitate travel across the European road network, to promote the
development of EU-wide ICT transport service markets, and to provide new tools for the
implementation of EU transport policy.
EETS will complement electronic road toll systems that are operated nationally or locally
in Member States. Member States are to decide independently on the introduction of
road tolls as well as on the structure and amount of the tolls. There are currently some
200 electronic road toll systems in use across the European Union, and only some of
them are interoperable. As yet there is not a single EETS service provider in Europe.
Work has now started in France and Germany to develop the first electronic road toll
systems that support EETS.
Implementation of EETS has fallen behind schedule and the European Commission has
suggested a stepwise approach to achieving Europe-wide interoperability via regional
systems. However those regional systems must be compliant with EETS definitions.
EETS introduces satellite positioning systems alongside existing systems that are based
on shortwave communications. In practice interoperability will be achieved by on-board
EETS units that support both satellite technology and shortwave communications, while
the roadside equipment will be dependent on the road toll operators. EU regulations state
that EETS units must have the ability to download other applications as well.
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5. Road pricing in Finland
What might be the motives for the introduction of road pricing in Finland?
5.1 Integrating transport policy objectives with taxation
Transport policy ties in closely with public policy more generally. The purpose of the
transport system is to enable society to function, to create the necessary conditions for
growth and to boost Finland’s competitiveness. Transport policy is not just about the
building and maintenance of transport infrastructure, but more broadly about resolving
problems of movement and transport through the application of public policy tools,
regardless of administrative boundaries and jurisdictions.
The current system of road taxation is the outcome of a long chain of historical
development. The prime motive for taxing road users has always been to raise tax
revenue for the government. During the current decade the taxation of road transport
has increasingly moved to incorporate energy and environmental policy objectives.
Today, the amount of car tax and the base component of the annual vehicle tax depend
upon the vehicle’s carbon dioxide emissions. The fuel tax and motive force tax, then,
take account of the energy and carbon content of the fuel as well as local emissions.
Although most of the revenue from the taxation of road transport already comes through
taxes on vehicle use, i.e. the fuel tax, and although public transport benefits from various
tax subsidies, the link between taxation and transport policy objects is still rather weak
and tenuous.
In any event the taxation of motoring needs to be reviewed and rethought in Finland
because increasing fuel efficiency and the growing number of electric cars mean that
long-term tax revenue is inevitably going to be affected.
The taxation of motoring could be a highly effective tool of transport policy. For this
reason it makes sense to explore the possibilities of overhauling the existing tax system
so that it could support not only government finances and environmental objectives, but
also transport policy objectives. It is a waste of society’s resources to try and resolve
transport policy problems by ineffective means if there is an effective option as well.
Needless to say, an overhaul of the tax system that at once makes it a transport policy
tool must be justified in terms of socio-economic effects, that is the benefits to public
finances must outweigh the costs to public finances.
5.2 Economic regulation
The aim and purpose of transport policy is to ensure that traffic moves smoothly and
safely and causes minimum environmental harm. One of the key factors with respect to
achieving these goals is the volume of traffic. Economic regulation can contribute to
influencing transport performance, i.e. to increasing the efficiency of the transport
system, reducing environmental harm, improving safety and securing government tax
revenue.
The existing system of road taxation consists of taxes levied on the purchase of new
cars, the availability of the vehicle for road use, and the de facto use of the vehicle (car
tax, base tax component of the annual vehicle tax, motive force tax and fuel tax). The
most significant tax item, the amount of fuel tax paid by the motorist in the price of fuel,
is directly dependent on the distance driven and driving style (variable tax). By contrast
the amount of tax payable in the form of car tax, base tax in vehicle tax, and motive
force tax is not dependent on kilometres driven; in this sense they are fixed. In other
words motorists cannot decide to drive less, for instance, in order to reduce their tax bill.
They can, on the other hand, influence the amount they have to pay in car tax, the base
amount of the vehicle tax and motive force tax through the choice of vehicle, because
these taxes are determined based on the car’s retail price, age, carbon dioxide emissions
and type of fuel. Furthermore by temporarily decommissioning a vehicle from road use it
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is possible to reduce the amount of vehicle tax payable because that tax is calculated on
a daily basis.
Fixed taxes have a much lesser effect on people’s driving behaviour than direct taxes on
consumption. At worst, the steering effect of fixed taxes may be exactly opposite to that
intended. For instance, the motive force tax levied on diesel cars may encourage people
to drive as much as possible in order to justify their driving such a vehicle rather than a
petrol-driven car. Fixed taxes also mean that motorists who drive less than average pay
more tax per kilometre driven than those who drive more than average.
The tax bases for motoring are currently the same throughout the country. The only tax
in the existing regime that would lend itself to regional modulation would be the vehicle
tax. Currently some one-third of all taxes paid by motorists are fixed taxes (car, vehicle
and motive force tax) and two-thirds are variable taxes (fuel tax). One way of moving
towards a road tax system that places greater weight on vehicle use would be to
substitute fixed motoring taxes with variables ones. The replacement of the car and
vehicle tax with a kilometre tax based on time, place and type of vehicle would lend
stronger support to transport policy objectives than the current system.
A kilometre tax would have a greater effect on driving or overall traffic volumes than
fixed taxes because it would be levied on the actual use of cars. The amount of tax
payable can also be adjusted according to the car’s environmental performance, so that
each kilometre driven affects the amount of emissions coming from the car’s exhausts. It
is also easier to predict the level of tax revenues because there is very little annual
variation in the number of kilometres driven, whereas purchases of new cars can and do
fluctuate. A kilometre tax would also provide a way of taxing electric cars other than
through taxing the car itself or electricity.
Couldn’t all these same effects be achieved by incorporating fixed motoring taxes into the
fuel tax? There is a clear connection between the fuel tax and car use: the more people
drive and the fuel-thirstier their driving style, the more tax they have to pay. Fuel tax
can internalise the costs of CO2 emissions. Fuel tax also internalises the costs from local
emissions at the national level. However fuel tax cannot be used to reduce local
emissions, for instance in city centres. Fuel tax does not require tracking the location of
vehicles, it is a simple and straightforward administrative task and highly cost effective.
However increasing the fuel tax involves some obvious problems. A fuel tax hike could
not be restricted to passenger cars except by creating an extremely laborious refund
mechanism to compensate professional road hauliers. Fuel tax can be used to influence
traffic volumes, but not to increase the efficiency of the transport network because it
cannot be regionally differentiated; it has to be the same throughout the country. It
follows that a fuel tax hike would have the greatest effect on motorists who have to drive
the longest distances and who have no option but to use their car.
Fuel tax cannot be used to internalise congestion costs. Driving in heavy traffic increases
fuel consumption, but these costs are internal to the motorist and do not cover the
external costs caused by the motorist, i.e. the extra amount of time that other road users
have to spend getting to their destination. It is true that the problem of congestion in the
metropolitan Helsinki region could be resolved by effecting a sharp hike in fuel tax, but
this would mean that all motorists around the country would have to pay for resolving
the congestion problems in Helsinki.
If Finland had a significantly higher fuel tax and therefore a higher price level than its
neighbouring countries, this would certainly encourage some fuel tourism into those
countries.
5.3 Funding
The single most important motive for the introduction of road pricing has always been to
secure funding. Revenue from road pricing has been used to finance either specific road
17
projects or the building of larger road networks. In Finland the building and maintenance
of public roads is financed from the State Budget. In recent years the overall quality of
the road network has deteriorated as the appropriations available for road maintenance
have fallen short of needs. It might be suggested that securing funding for road
maintenance might be one motive for the introduction of road pricing/taxes in Finland.
However things are not as simple and straightforward as that. The Government taxes
road transport to the tune of almost six billion euros a year. Appropriations allocated for
purposes of road maintenance have been in the region of EUR 750 million a year. In
other words the amount of taxes collected from road transport exceed the amount of
money spent on road maintenance some seven times over. Revenue from road transport
taxes would be more than enough to cover the costs of road maintenance. Why the need
to collect even more taxes?
Taxes levied on road transport are part and parcel of the general taxation system that is
designed to cover all government expenditure. In Finland tax revenues cannot be
earmarked for any specific purpose. Parliament decides each year in the State Budget
how government funds are to be allocated for different purposes. In other words the
amount of tax revenue received from road transport and the amount of money made
available for purposes of road maintenance have nothing to do with each other. These
are political decisions.
Collecting more taxes from road transport (especially if the new taxes replace existing
ones) would therefore not automatically increase the amount of money available for road
maintenance. For this reason collecting funding for road maintenance cannot be a motive
for the introduction of road pricing or taxing in Finland. Road pricing can of course be
used to collect more tax revenue for government. However it would be more effective to
generate additional revenue by some other means, such as by increasing fuel tax, than
by introducing a road pricing scheme.
Regional or local road pricing/taxing constitutes an exception, however. Congestion
charging is one example of a local or regional tax that is considered in terms of an
extension or addition to existing taxes. Like other taxes, it would have universal
coverage. Revenue from congestion charging could be allocated to the appropriate State
Budget expenditure item in order make the funds available for the development of the
transport system in that area or region where the congestion charges have been
collected – otherwise it is not worthwhile for the region in question to introduce
congestion pricing in the first place. It is hardly conceivable, for instance, that congestion
charges collected in the Helsinki area are spent on developing transport systems in other
parts of the country, or on meeting other central government expenditure.
Toll roads
Conditions in Finland do not lend themselves very well to toll roads. This is because
transport volumes in Finland are fairly low in comparison with Central Europe, for
instance, and therefore it would be difficult to make them economically viable. One of the
key ideas of toll motorways is that they provide shorter and faster routes to the intended
destination than non-toll roads. In Finland this would be much harder to achieve because
distances between motorway junctions are very short. For this reason it would be difficult
to create attractive toll roads in Finland, especially as the old, non-toll roads usually run
alongside the motorway. Accordingly if road pricing were applied to motorways only,
larger volumes of traffic would move back to the lower road network, which is not
desirable. In other words the application of instruments of economic regulation would be
counterproductive.
Taxing transit traffic
Finland, too, is a transit country. Large volumes of transit traffic pass through the
country from and into Russia. In practice foreign registered HGVs do not pay anything for
using the Finnish road network, unless they stop to fill up. There has been some talk in
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Finland about introducing HGV road pricing, but the reports so far have concluded that
collecting such charges is not in line with our transport policy objectives.
Road charging must not be discriminatory, so Finland cannot decide to introduce HGV
taxes or charges that apply to foreign-registered vehicles only. Any HGV road pricing
scheme would have to apply to domestic hauliers as well. Finland’s geographical distance
from major international markets is considerable, and even within the country transport
distances are long. For these reasons the tax burden on HGV transport has been kept at
the lowest level possible. The HGV motive force tax and diesel tax in Finland are very
close to minimum EU levels. If Finland were to introduce a vignette charge, for instance,
that would push up costs for domestic road hauliers. Taxes corresponding to the vignette
charge could not be deducted from the motive force tax, which it is close to the EU
minimum as it is. A survey by the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the
Ministry of Finance in 2010 showed that the introduction of the Euro-vignette would have
added tens of millions of euros on domestic road hauliers’ existing tax burden. At the
same time the collection of vignette fees from foreign HGVs would have generated
annual net revenues of no more than some EUR 6 million.
Congestion charging
In Finland, significant congestion problems are only experienced in the metropolitan
Helsinki region. The Ministry of Transport and Communications has twice conducted a
survey to assess the impacts of congestion charging in and around Helsinki. Both these
surveys considered the societal and traffic impacts of congestion pricing and the question
of how congestion pricing can contribute to achieving transport policy objectives.
The findings showed that a transport system that incorporates congestion charging better
meets the objectives set for the Helsinki region than a transport system that does not
include congestion charging. Congestion charging would reduce congestion in the region,
make traffic move faster, increase the competitiveness of public transport and the
proportion of travel by public transport, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other
environmental harm, and improve traffic safety.
Furthermore, the surveys clearly showed that congestion pricing is most effective as part
of a long-term strategy that combines a commitment to developing public transport,
infrastructure investment and the financing of these investments. Despite all this strong
evidence, no decisions have as yet been made on the introduction of congestion pricing
in the Helsinki region.
5.4 Impacts of taxation based on vehicle use
Abandoning fixed taxes and adopting a tax regime based exclusively on vehicle use
would have a variety of impacts. Taxing vehicle use would change people’s perceptions of
the costs of transport, which in turn would affect the volume of traffic. There would
probably be fewer passenger cars on the road, which would also mean less emissions
from transport and increased safety. Lower traffic volumes also reduce the costs of road
maintenance. If the volume of traffic were to fall significantly, it might be possible to
postpone or even withdraw some infrastructure investments.
The increased costs of car use would improve the relative competitiveness of public
transport, driving up the number of people using public transport.
Price of new cars
Abandoning the car tax and other fixed taxes would inevitably affect the automotive
market. The key factor is how the withdrawal of the car tax would affect the price of new
cars. Studies have shown that car manufacturers’ pre-tax prices are lower when sold to
countries that levy car taxes and other similar fees. Therefore the factory prices of new
cars imported to Finland are slightly lower than in countries that do not have a car tax.
However country differences are considerable.
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It is a frequently voiced concern that if the car tax were withdrawn, this would only lead
to car manufacturers putting up their prices accordingly. The benefits from the tax
reduction would be eaten up by car factories abroad. However this scenario does not
seem very likely. This is largely because the market situation in Finland is different from
those countries that do not have a car tax. In Finland the consumer knows exactly how
much the car price needs to go down if the tax rules are changed. If in this situation
there is no movement in salesroom prices, the consumer will simply go to some other
market or buy a car make that has reduced its prices. This is possible because if the car
tax were indeed withdrawn, consumers could go to Estonia or other countries to buy their
car without having to pay any car tax in Finland. Therefore the price of new cars sold in
Finland could not be significantly higher than the prices in nearby markets. It is quite
natural that car manufacturers and retailers are keen to increase their own margins.
However this is a fiercely competitive market. Normal market mechanisms will ensure
that car prices in Finland will be at or around the European average. This average is
lower than current prices, but higher than the current pre-tax price.
This change would also have a bearing on the tax-free import of used cars, as well as on
the value and markets of domestic used cars. However the Working Group has not
assessed these impacts.
The existing car tax rate is based on the vehicle’s carbon dioxide emissions. This
encourages consumers to purchase lower emissions cars. Sales of low emissions cars
have indeed increased in recent years. The true scale of emissions from new cars has not
necessarily decreased accordingly because people typically drive more than average
when they have a new car. The impact of the car tax on emission levels, therefore, will
play out slowly over the long term.
The decision to abandon the car tax would obviously mean losing this particular
regulatory instrument. Consumers might be inclined to go back to buying high emissions
cars again, creating a risk of increased emissions. This, however, can be prevented by
determining part of the kilometre tax rate according to the vehicle’s emissions. The
emissions component of the kilometre tax can be adjusted exactly according to the
intended regulatory effect.
A reduced car tax rate would also have the effect of gradually lowering the average age
of the existing car fleet, which in turn would affect emissions levels and road safety.
The kilometre tax has a greater impact on emission levels than the car tax. Even so the
achievement of emissions targets may require some regulatory intervention through car
prices. The Working Group has not made any assessment of whether a combined car and
kilometre tax would be more effective in the achievement of emissions targets than the
current system or a kilometre tax alone.
Whole passenger car fleet to be taxed based on vehicle use
One key question in the possible switchover to a tax regime based on vehicle use is
whether or not this reform would only affect new cars or all cars on the road. It would
obviously be easier for consumers to understand the kilometre tax reform if it only
applied to new cars. This, however, is not practically possible because if the kilometre tax
were to apply only to new cars purchased after the reform, then that might encourage
consumers to favour domestic second-hand cars, which would be at variance with the
transport policy, environmental policy as well as public finances objectives of the
kilometre tax. Furthermore vehicles manufactured and imported second hand into
Finland before the introduction of the tax would be excluded from all tax regulation,
because EU rules would not allow either of these taxes to be applied. This might lead to
increased imports of vehicles in this age bracket. For the reasons stated above it is
possible that tax revenues might fall short of targets, and an attempt to fill this shortfall
by the introduction of a kilometre tax applied only to new cars might excessively hamper
the renewal of the existing passenger car fleet. For these reasons the Ministry of Finance
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has taken the view that the kilometre tax should be applied to the whole existing
passenger car fleet from the very outset. However this question requires further
investigation because a stepwise approach to changeover would be a much easier way to
move forward for both technical and practical reasons.
HGVs excluded from kilometre tax
In the case of passenger cars the basic idea is to replace fixed taxes with a kilometre tax.
Buses and coaches in Finland only pay fuel tax, i.e. no fixed taxes at all. They would
therefore be exempted from kilometre tax. The application of the tax to buses and
coaches would increase bus and coach service costs, which would contravene transport
policy objectives.
HGVs are subject to a fixed tax in the form of the motive force tax. However this tax
cannot be changed into a kilometre tax because the motive force tax is already very
close to the minimum level specified in the Euro-vignette directive. Therefore the effects
of imposing a kilometre tax could not be offset by reducing fixed taxes. The imposition of
a kilometre tax on HGV transport on top of existing taxes would drive up Finland’s
logistics costs and again contravene transport policy objectives.
Community structure
The price of transport also affects the community structure. Several international studies
have shown that economic regulation of transport contributes to creating to a denser
community structure. This in turn is conducive to a more effective transport system, a
more coherent urban structure, and to reduced costs of both public transport and
municipal infrastructure provision.7 On the other hand the prevention of urban
fragmentation and the development of a denser community structure are crucially
important to the maintenance of an effective transport system. A more cohesive
community structure adds to productivity in society.8
A kilometre tax is also capable of affecting transport costs in different regions. For
instance, lowering the tax rate in regions that have no public transport can help to
preserve the vitality of rural areas. Accordingly the kilometre tax can be higher in areas
where people have ready access to public transport. However regional pricing schemes
must not be allowed to compromise the competitiveness of regions.
Business opportunities
The increasing integration of technology into transport, the growth of intelligent
transport, the increasing on-board use of broadband etc. are all set to create new
business opportunities for companies in the areas of intelligent transport and transport
pricing solutions. Already the global intelligent transport markets are worth tens of
billions of euros. It has been predicted that by 2019, the value of the global services
market will be in excess of 100 billion euros.9
Smart transport services open up new business opportunities in three directions:
7 SCATTER: Sprawling Cities and Transport: from Evaluation to Recommendations (2005), System for
planning and research in towns and cities for urban sustainability (1998).
8 Heikki A. Loikkanen ”Kaupunkialueiden maankäyttö ja taloudellinen kehitys – maapolitiikan vaikutuksista
tuottavuuteen sekä työ- ja asuntomarkkinoiden kehitykseen”, VATT (2013) ?”Urban land use and economic
development : effects of land policies on productivity and functioning of labour and housing markets”?
9 Transparency Market Research 2013: Global Connected Car Market – Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth,
Trends and Forecast, 2013-2019, Albany, New York (PRWEB) October 17, 2013
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1. Continuing advances in technology are creating whole new services that make it easier for
people to move and travel and that are integrated with other everyday services used by road
users.
2. Significant business opportunities are also created through the evolution of existing business
services.
3. Indirect effects are created through other industries as transport services are linked up with
them.
Some of these services may grow and develop very quickly, but others will unfold over
the longer term with the development of competencies and facilitating technologies.
Strong growth potential makes these services a high attractive future proposition for
Finnish businesses that have world class expertise in all key technologies. For instance,
GPS-based pricing using a multi-service concept would be a world first and give Finnish
experts a competitive edge in the future global markets.
The collection of road charges has been moving from physical toll booths towards on-
board GPS units, such as in the case of the HGV charges collected in Germany and
Slovakia. Third generation road charges are paving the way to the evolution of other
services that use the same technology. In these models users can choose the most
suitable technology for each situation and select the services they want. Already a large
market has grown up around second generation road charges, with the biggest
commercial operators coming from countries that have pioneered electronic road toll
collection systems, such as Norway and Austria. Local businesses have developed
significant expertise in these areas and grown into major international concerns. However
third generation road pricing has not yet been started anywhere, so the field is open for
new entrants.
In Finland, too, a large part of intelligent transport services and related business
opportunities will materialise regardless of the fate of the GPS-based kilometre tax.
However international experiences have shown that the introduction of road pricing
systems has always and in all countries generated new business as well.
It is difficult to give an accurate estimate of the value of the new business. In 2012 ITS
provided work for 1,700 people, and the sector is export-oriented.10 In comparative
countries the introduction of road pricing has provided a major boost to industry growth.
In Austria more than 20,000 people are employed in this sector, and exports account for
some 80% of its EUR 1.1 billion turnover. A realistic target for Finland would be to
achieve a one per cent share of the world’s ITS turnover, which in 2019 would be around
one billion euros. This would mean close to 20,000 jobs. A kilometre tax system based on
a multi-service concept would certainly support the achievement of these objectives.
Obviously a prerequisite for job creation in Finland is that Finnish companies are
successful in the competitive international marketplace.
10 Leviäkangas, P.; Zulkarnain, Z.; Roine, M. 2012. The Finnish ITS market size and structure – a microeconomic
approach. 19th ITS World Congress 2012, Vienna Austria, 22-26 Oct. 2012
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Figure 1. Socio-economic effects of road taxing based on vehicle use
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6.  Legislative issues
There are several important legislative issues that must be considered in planning and
implementing a road pricing mechanism. These include the conditions laid down by EU
law and the Constitution regarding the organisation and content of such a system, the
requirements of privacy protection and information security, and questions related to
monitoring, sanctions and legal protection.
One key consideration in planning a road pricing scheme is EU legislation and its
development. Road pricing would probably be built around an on-board units transmitting
information, so for this reason system developers will have to take account of EETS
regulations governing European electronic toll services. In rough outline the EETS system
involves the following parties:
Figure 1. Main parties in EETS system
EETS regulations are in place to govern the technology used as well as the broader
operation of the system. Since the purpose of these regulations is to promote freedom of
movement by ensuring the interoperability of road toll systems, it can be safely assumed
that any new technologies developed in the future will also be covered by these
regulations. It is paramount therefore that an active effort is made to monitor European
developments in this sector and to influence the development of EU legislation. This also
applies to the energy tax directive and the Euro-vignette directive which, as they stand,
prevent the replacement of the fuel tax and HGV motive force tax with a kilometre tax.
6.1 Tax or fee?
The constitutional nature of road pricing impacts the required legislative standard, the
level of legislative detail, the payer’s duties and legal protection, and the authority’s
powers. Furthermore it also determines how revenue from road pricing shall be handled
and how and for what purposes it may be allocated.
According to the Constitutional Law Committee’s established decision-making practice a
constitutional charge is defined as a remuneration or consideration for a service provided
by a public authority. The service provided in exchange for payment must be identifiable.
The payment must reflect the costs arising from the provision of the service, although full
cost equivalence is not always required. Gratuitous payments or fees or charges collected
for purposes of financing some activity without any service provided in exchange, on the
other hand, are taxes. The key to this distinction lies in the question of what constitutes
the identifiable service provided in exchange for a fee or charge collected, and whether
EETS service provider collects data
for taxation purposes. Motorists
establish contractual relations with
service providers. On-board units are
supplied by the service provider.
EETS user, i.e. a motorist driving in a
road toll domain.
Road toll operator, i.e. a public or
private organisation receiving road
charges from vehicles in an EETS
domain (in practice the tax
authorities).
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that payment is voluntary or involuntary. The fact that road tolls and charges are
involuntary points in the direction of a tax payment.
In the case of road pricing the assessment of whether or not the charges are involuntary
must also consider the options available to road users. The road charge might be
considered voluntary in situations where the destination concerned can be reached via
more than one route; the charge is simply applied to the choice of using the option that
provides a better standard of service. However this is not possible in a national road
pricing scheme that would provide the most effective avenue to economic regulation.
The cost equivalence principle, in this context, means that the payment charged should
not exceed the costs arising from the production of the service or commodity. There
should be no surplus, and at least the revenue generated should not be available for
other purposes. For instance, charges collected from motorists should not be spent on
subsiding public transport in general.
The choice of specific term is irrelevant. Bearing in mind the objectives set for the road
pricing system and the concerns voiced about fairness, road pricing would in any case be
considered a form of taxing. Indeed instead of a toll charged for the use of a specific road
or road network or a charge designed to cover road maintenance costs, it might be
possible to refer to a tax levied on the use of a motor-driven vehicle. It would be natural
to extend this tax to apply to all vehicle use in Finland, but the tax rate could be varied,
within the bounds of equal treatment of taxpayers, according to time, place and type of
vehicle.
According to Section 81 of the Finnish Constitution, the imposition of a state tax must be
expressly established by law. The Act shall contain provisions on the grounds for tax
liability and the amount of tax payable, as well as on the legal remedies available to the
persons or entities liable. The legal provisions must be specific and accurate so that the
authorities enforcing the law have limited discretion in the determination of the tax. The
requirement of legislative accuracy also means that the definition of tax liability or the
amount of tax payable cannot be left to be done in connection with the drafting of
decrees or even lower level rules and regulations. Questions related to legal protection
have a bearing on such issues as access to data collected on the vehicle’s movements in
the event of appeals, for instance. If road charges could be defined constitutionally as
fees or charges, then it would be necessary to adopt legal provisions regarding the
general grounds for charging fees and the size of the fees charged. The accuracy
requirements with regard to the determination of fees are somewhat less stringent than
those concerning taxes.
6.2 Information protection and monitoring
The retailed regulatory requirements related to information protection will only become
clear once system planning has reached a more advanced stage and more is known
about technical implementation, system organisation and the specific data processed.
Legislation and restrictions arising from legislation must be considered against the
various taxation options. It is certainly worthwhile to compare alternative models of
implementing a tax system based on vehicle use and to weigh their relative effects on
privacy protection. For instance, such questions as where the data are stored, who and
where can these data be accessed, and where and when they can be linked with other
data are of crucial significance to how legislation restricts or enables the processing of
personal data. Indeed at the planning stage it makes sense to consider which option is
least restrictive from a privacy point of view. Furthermore it is important to bear in mind
that EETS regulations limit the range of options available. Also it is necessary to observe
that EU personal data legislation is being revised, and any changes will have an
immediate impact on privacy protection on the Finnish system of taxing vehicle use.
New ways of processing privacy sensitive information are now being developed and will
soon be available. Instead of registers kept by the authorities, data on vehicle use could
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be administered (but not modified) by owners or keepers of vehicles for instance via an
online citizen account. The authorities responsible for collecting the tax would at regular
intervals receive the information necessary for determining the tax, which might include
distances driven in each tariff zone or simply the amount taxable. No details would be
needed on location data, nor any mechanisms for up-to-date monitoring. This would go a
long way towards allaying people’s concerns about their privacy protection. Furthermore
taxpayers could for themselves ascertain that their taxes are right, which would
effectively eliminate any unnecessary complaints. The authorities would have the right to
access more detailed information about vehicle use only on grounds separately detailed
in the law in cases where a tax decision is contested or in the event of suspected misuse.
Taxation and its accuracy could be automatically controlled through information systems
without jeopardising privacy protection. The following chart illustrates the flow and
management of information:
Figure 2. Flow and management of information
In this example (Figure 2) vehicle location coordinates are transmitted to on-board units
(OBU) via satellite. Based on this information the OBU stores the required positioning
data and at regular intervals transmits the data in encrypted form via a GSM connection
to the vehicle owner’s or keeper’s citizen’s account. Using the coordinates provided and
an electronic map, the software attached to the account makes the necessary
calculations to produce the vehicle use data, which can only be accessed by the owner of
the citizen’s account. The system would transmit to the national tax authorities only a
limited amount of data necessary for the determination of the tax; no detailed
information would be passed on regarding the actual use of the vehicle. Furthermore the
data would be transmitted at legally defined intervals after a time delay, so based on this
information it would be impossible to monitor the vehicle’s movements in real time.
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One example of an online citizen’s account comes from Estonia where such an account
has been compulsory for some ten years now. It was launched at the same time as the
X-road service platform, a joint venture by the relevant authorities and private
organisations. In Finland the State Treasury has launched an online service via which
citizens can access a host of electronic government services. Furthermore the Ministry of
Finance has taken charge of a project to develop a national service architecture that
follows the Estonian example: the idea is to integrate government services and a
selection of private services approved by each user. Planning has reached an advanced
state and the portal is due to open for business in 2015. Electronic services are bound to
attract increasing numbers of users in the near future, and they open up some
interesting opportunities for the implementation of a tax system based on vehicle use.
These opportunities must be given the closest possible attention in the subsequent
preparation of this matter.
One of the most critical considerations in planning a tax regime based on vehicle use is
privacy protection. Fail safe mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that data can
only be accessed by authorised people. Data transfer must be secured in such a way that
all data content remains unaltered during the transfer process and that no data is lost. In
the event that changes have occurred in the data, it must be possible to rectify the
mistakes. Furthermore EETS service providers must have adequate controls and
procedures in place to ensure that all private data (data on vehicle use) is protected.
Service providers will also be required to sign appropriate confidentiality provisions
before beginning to process these data.
One absolute precondition for the introduction of a tax system based on time and place is
to have in place a reliable control and monitoring mechanism. The only way to achieve
this is by means of automated technology. Monitoring must be effective and credible so
as to ensure that the collection of taxes works as planned. The collection of traffic and
transport data would probably require an on-board unit, which raises the possibility of
misuse. The extent to which OBU use can be controlled and monitored will largely depend
on its technical specifications. It is necessary to have some way of testing the OBU’s
operation, for instance through a memory that records all data related to the use of the
vehicle. The supervisory authorities or some other party should be able easily to check
the OBU data. At the same time, the unit should be protected to prevent unauthorised
access. On the other hand it must be possible from the outside to ascertain that the unit
is working without having to stop the vehicle, for instance by means of automatic
monitoring devices. The unit should also be equipped with sensors to detect and store
information of any deliberate attempt to damage the unit or any malfunction, and
automatically transmit a notification to the supervisory authorities. The OBU technical
specifications shall also detail the method of on-board installation. If it is installed into
the car’s electrical system, the unit will detect when the car is driven. Moving the car
under tow or on a flat bed will not attract tax.
If all passenger cars registered in Finland were equipped with OBUs, there would be 3.5
million vehicles in the country running such units. In addition it would be necessary to
account for foreign-registered vehicles. This poses some challenges to the principle of
freedom of movement. It is impossible to imagine any other credible mechanism for
monitoring the movement of foreign-registered vehicles than an automated system. The
police do not have the resources to monitor the use of OBUs other than in connection
with regular traffic patrolling, and in general the main concern and focus for the police is
on traffic safety. There are several options for how to organise this monitoring. Finnish
Customs, the Frontier Guard, MOT inspectors, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency and
the Finnish Transport Agency could all assist the police in its monitoring role (assuming
that it is automatic).
The legal protection of the individual liable to annual circulation tax must be prescribed in
legislative provisions regardless of whether this tax is defined as a tax or a fee. Good
governance and legal protection in administrative matters are constitutionally guaranteed
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basic rights. In the case of an annual circulation tax it is necessary to make provision for
legal remedies open to road users and possibly for earlier procedures for lodging a
complaint. Furthermore it is necessary to ensure by means of legislation that persons
liable to circulation tax have right of access to the data on vehicle use on which their
taxes are based. The introduction of a circulation tax does not require a whole new set of
provisions for legal protection, as remedial actions available to administration for
purposes of correcting material, procedural or typographical errors, for instance, are
provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003).
National legislation poses no obstacles to the development of a comprehensive national
road pricing system, but there are several significant legislative boundary conditions. If
such a system were to be introduced on a smaller scale, there would be less legislative
issues to consider as well, or they would be easier to resolve. The differences between
different solutions are considered from this point of view in the legislative working
group’s summary table.
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7. Impact assessments
This chapter discusses the impacts of a kilometre tax as compared to the existing tax
regime. The examination is based on a scenario analysis for the situation in 2025. The
decision to focus on this year is grounded in the recognition that decision-making,
legislation and technical implementation all require several years to play out.
Furthermore the possible move from the current system to a kilometre tax regime would
in any case require a transitional period.
The examination works from the assumption that the kilometre tax system would
generate the same amount of tax revenue as the current tax system in 2025. This
technical assumption is made because the level and amount of taxes collected from
motorists are political decisions.
The fiscal tax revenue requirement of no change in government tax receipts is at
variance with the principles of economic regulation. Economic regulation, say by means
of increased prices, is aimed at steering and changing people’s behaviour. If people do
change their behaviour and drive less, for instance, the objective of pricing changes will
be achieved. At the same time, however, government’s tax revenue will decline because
of the reduced overall volume of traffic. If in this situation the government decides to put
up taxes in order to offset the losses from reduced tax receipts, consumers will easily
consider this as a punishment for doing what they have been asked to do. For this reason
it is necessary to have open public debate about the relationship between fiscal
requirements and economic regulation. The Working Group takes no stance on this issue,
however.
7.1 Models used
The impact assessment is based on the national strategic transport models developed in
the Finnish Transport Agency’s methods development programme. The analyses of
projected impacts are described in more detail in a separate report. The discussion here
only outlines the main findings and results.
The impact assessments use computational models to provide broad and diverse
information about the kilometre tax system and its effects on individual passengers and
the transport system as a whole. For this purpose two separate, mutually complementary
assessment models have been developed: the individual model and the transport
forecasting model. The individual model simulates the choices made by individual people
in different parts of the country, while the transport forecasting model assesses the
national impacts at the transport system level.
The individual model estimates the ability of citizens to adapt to changes in the transport
system in the long term, in a scenario where residents can respond to those changes not
only by choosing another route or mode of transport, but also by changing their
destination or car ownership status. The model describes local transport conditions in
great detail, and therefore it is also used to describe the future transport structure.
The transport forecasting model, by contrast, describes at a strategic level the main
national transport links between relatively large regions and transport system service
standards in different scenarios using short-term elasticities, based on the assumption
that only mode of transport and route can be chosen. The forecasting model therefore is
effectively a change model that only predicts changes in the relative proportion of
different modes of transport as a result of changes in transport supply and costs. This is
the primary objective of the forecasting model because it is easy to change and analyse
the model’s description of transport system especially in future scenarios. The individual
model, then, is based on small grid cells, allowing local demand to be modelled with
much greater accuracy. At the same time, however, it is much harder to provide a
detailed description of transport systems. The two-model approach therefore effectively
combines the strengths of different methods.
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7.2 Alternatives compared
The analyses are based on trend projections extending to 2025, with traffic volumes
projected to increase by 16% from 2012 as a result of population growth and economic
development. There are no changes in the structure of the system or prices, but
improved fuel efficiency as a result of advances in vehicle technology mean there will be
less revenue from fuel tax. Car tax and annual vehicle tax revenue will also fall because
of reduced carbon dioxide emissions.
Current tax system
The existing tax model consists of current taxes. Increasing fuel efficiency has the effect
of reducing revenue from the base component of the annual vehicle tax and fuel tax. The
examination works from the assumption that government will increase these taxes
accordingly so that overall tax revenue remains unchanged at its current level. In
addition the growing number of cars on the road will drive up revenue from car tax. Fuel
tax revenue is the same in all scenarios.
Kilometre systems
The existing passenger car tax system consists of fuel tax, car tax, the base component
of the annual vehicle tax and the motive force tax. The latter three are fixed taxes; the
amount of tax payable does not depend on kilometres driven. In the kilometre tax model
these taxes are replaced by a kilometre tax so that the amount of tax payable is
dependent on the distance driven.
The basic idea of the kilometre tax model is that the car tax and base component of the
annual vehicle tax are changed into a kilometre tax. In 2025 the kilometre tax would be
3.3 cents per kilometre and charged to all passenger cars regardless of the fuel they use.
The kilometre tax is divided into two components, the emissions component and the
regional tariff zone component. The emissions component is based on the vehicle’s CO2
emissions and it is designed to have an environmental regulatory effect. The regional
component of the tax is variable and can be used to influence transport costs in different
regions. The impact assessments use no set unit price for the carbon dioxide emissions
component, but the unit price is included in the average regional component. This is
because the relative weight attached to these factors is a political decision.
The existing motive force tax levied on passenger cars is replaced one-on-one by a
motive force kilometre tax, which is charged to all cars using fuels other than petrol (e.g.
diesel cars). The motive force kilometre tax would be determined based on the weight of
the car, as is the case under the current regime. The average motive force kilometre tax
in 2025 is 2.0 cents/km.
The reason for replacing the motive force tax with a separate kilometre tax is that if the
motive force tax were added together with the car tax and the base component of the
annual vehicle tax and divided by the total number of kilometres driven, owners of petrol
cars would have to pay taxes on behalf of diesel owners, and the taxation of diesel cars
would be reduced. The assessment proceeds from the assumption that the tax levied on
diesels fuel in 2025 remains lower than the tax levied on petrol.
The differences between the current tax system and the kilometre tax system are
described in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3. Current tax system and kilometre tax system
The examination of the kilometre tax system is based on two separate models. The first
kilometre tax model applies a flat kilometre tax rate for the whole country (3.3
cents/km). In the second model the kilometre tax rate varies in different regions
(regional kilometre model). The classification for the regional kilometre model is based
on the Finnish Environment Institute’s autumn 2013 typology of urban-rural areas
(Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Urban-rural functional typology (Finnish Environment Institute)
Based on this typology Finland is divided into three types of regions: urban areas,
densely populated rural areas and sparsely populated rural areas. Urban areas consist
of inner urban areas, outer urban areas and peri-urban areas. Densely populated rural
areas consist of local centres in rural areas and rural areas close to urban areas.
Sparsely populated rural areas comprise rural heartlands and sparsely populated rural
areas.
The regional kilometre model compares two different modulations. These regional
modulations are examples for purposes of illustrating the effects of different prices in
different tariff zones. The regional price also includes the CO2 component of the kilometre
tax.
Area  Modulation 1 Modulation 2
Urban area       4.15     3.85
Densely populated rural
area
      3.0     3.0
Sparsely populated rural
area
      1.0     2.0
Table 2. Regional kilometre tax, cents/km
Urban-rural classification
Inner urban areas
Outer urban areas
Peri-urban areas
Local centres in rural areas
Rural areas close to urban areas
Rural heartland
Sparsely populated rural areas
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Tax revenue in different models
Figure 5 describes the level of tax revenue generated in different model. The trend
projection describes a scenario where taxes are unchanged at their current level. Under
this scenario improved fuel efficiency would reduce tax revenue by some EUR 700 million
from 2012 to 2025. Reduced revenue from car tax would account for some EUR 180
million and reduced revenue from the base component of the vehicle tax for over EUR 50
million.
In the current system tax revenue can be retained at its current level by increasing the
rates of car tax, vehicle tax and fuel tax to reflect improving fuel efficiency. Under the
current tax system, therefore, tax revenue in 2025 would come in at EUR 5.35 billion.
Tax revenue from the kilometre systems is set as equal to revenue under the current tax
system in 2025. The kilometre tax would contribute to reduce the total number of
kilometres driven because it has a greater effect on consumer behaviour than fixed
taxes. For this reason it has been necessary to increase the unit price of the kilometre
tax so that government revenue would remain the same as in the current model. The
Table also shows the effect of regional modulations on tax revenue.
Figure 5. Tax revenue and its breakdown in different scenarios
2012 2025 trend Current regime Kilometremodel
Regional model
1
Regional model
2
Kilometre tax - sparse rural (base part) 398 128 249
Kilometre tax - dense rural (base part) 254 236 230
Kilometre tax - urban (base part) 1011 1266 1176
Kilometretax energy-part 340 340 340
Vehicle tax (energy part) 274 340 340
Heavy Goods vehicle energy tax (KVV) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Vehicle tax (base part) 438 382 486
Car purchase tax 1 000 824 1 000
Petrol taxes (inc HGV+VAT) 3471 2 927 3 472 3 289 3329 3303
0
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Impacts on number of trips taken
Figure 6 shows the impacts of different tax models on the number of trips taken.
Comparisons are made with the trend projection so that the impacts of the current tax
system can also be made clearly visible. The kilometre tax system would reduce the
volume of passenger car traffic by some 30 million trips, which would be made by public
transport instead. These changes are relatively minor in passenger car transport where
the annual number of trips is around 3.5 billion, but very considerable in public transport
where the baseline figures are much lower.
Figure 6. Impacts of current tax system and different kilometre tax models on number of
trips compared to the 2025 trend projections as based on the forecasting model.
Changes in transport performance
Changes in transport performance are a major focus in assessing the impact of
regulatory charges and fees. This is because the effects on performance, emissions and
safety are directly dependent on how much people would drive under different models.
Figure 7 shows the impacts on transport performance at a national level. The kilometre
models would reduce the volume of passenger car traffic four times more than the
current tax system. Overall the differences between the models are minor, but it does
seem that transport performances decrease somewhat more under the flat rate option
than under the other kilometre models.
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Figure 7. Impacts of current tax system and different kilometre models on passenger
performances compared to 2025 trend projection
In percentage terms the changes in passenger car transport are quite marginal, but
again in public transport rather significant because of the lower reference levels. An
increased demand for public transport would obviously increase the costs of public
transport provision, but on the other hand the so-called Mohring effect would also come
into play: a marked increase in the number of users would improve service standards
and increase competitiveness because the large number of commuters means it is
necessary to increase the frequency of services. In the best case scenario it will also be
possible to reduce the volume of contracted transport services. These mechanisms have
been described as the positive feedback effects from the demand for public transport.
However these effects have not yet been incorporated into the model networks.
Figure 8 shows the changes in transport performance on the road network in different
pricing zones. Urban areas account for most of the performance, and in kilometre terms
the changes brought about by different models are greatest in the same areas. However
in percentage terms the biggest changes are seen in sparsely populated rural areas,
depending on their pricing levels. This observation lends support to the differences in the
nature of trips as discussed earlier.
The transport forecast presented here is not detailed enough to allow an assessment of
whether the introduction of a kilometre tax would reduce congestion in the metropolitan
Helsinki area, for instance, or whether it would increase the need to expand the supply of
public transport in this area. An assessment of these impacts would require a more
detailed analysis. The kilometre tax differs from congestion charging in many ways. For
instance, the kilometre tax is the same regardless of the time of day, whereas congestion
charging is applicable during certain hours of the days only. A national kilometre tax
could obviously be used for purposes of local congestion pricing by imposing different
charges for peak congestion hours in specified areas.
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Figure 8. Changes in passenger car and van transport performance under different
kilometre models compared to the current tax system by pricing zone. Computed based
on trip location on the road network rather than place of residence.
Externalities
With respect to externalities, the change in the number of traffic accidents and emissions
is a direct result of changes in transport performance. The kilometre tax model has a
considerably greater impact than the current tax system (Figure 9). Furthermore it is
noteworthy that in all models the magnitude of the overall impact could be influenced by
abandoning the requirement of fiscal impacts. The models therefore are not purely
regulatory in nature, but place heavy emphasis on the fiscal element.
Figure 9. Impact of different models on greenhouse gas emissions and number of
road accidents.
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Changes in externalities can also be converted into money terms (Table 3). Under the
kilometre models annual emissions and accidents costs would decrease by EUR 140-180
million as compared to the trend projection.
Cost category Current system Kilometre
model (flat
rate)
Regional
modulation 1
Regional
modulation 2
Emission costs -3.3   -14.7   -11.5   -13.1
Costs from accidents            -38   -166   -131   -159
Total         -41.3   -180.7  -146.5  --172.1
Table 3. Impact of different models on emission and accident costs compared to trend
projection, EUR million.
Impacts on traffic volumes
Although the various road pricing models have only a relatively minor impact on the
number of trips and overall transport performance, their effect on the major national
road transport corridors are quite significant (Figure 10). As is clearly evident, the
impacts on road traffic volumes are most substantial in areas where public transport
services are strong enough to provide a clear alternative, i.e. between the major cities in
southern Finland. The impact on the breakdown of investment needs between the road
and public transport infrastructure would probably be substantial.
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Figure 10. Changes in passenger car and van traffic volumes under flat rate kilometre
model compared to current tax system.
Distribution of impacts
The distribution of impacts has been assessed based on the individual model.
Calculations are based on the average vehicle (age) of the region concerned because no
household data are available on the average age of cars. Therefore the results describe
average changes; individual changes can obviously be very different.
Figure 11 describes the impact of the kilometre tax system on public transport use. As
expected the use of public transport as a proportion of total transport performance would
increase most in southern Finland and in urban municipalities where demand conditions
are strongest for public transport. The change in passenger car performance would be
quite evenly distributed across the country (Figure 12).
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Figure 11. Changes in the share of public transport by region
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Figure 12. Changes in passenger car performance by region
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Figures 13 and 14 describe the impacts of the road taxation overhaul on the total costs of
passenger car transport in different regions and under different alternative models. As
can be seen, the taxes paid by motorists would be lower in the kilometre model than in
the current tax system in all income brackets and in all regions. This result is explained
by the fact that the individual model describes people’s behaviour in the long term. The
model takes account of how motorists react to changes in their costs for instance by
driving less, by exchanging their car for a make or model that is more fuel efficient, etc.
In other words the model describes the very changes in behaviour that a tax reform
would bring about.
Figure 13. Impacts of changes in passenger car taxation on overall road transport costs
(all fixed and variable taxable journey costs) in different income brackets by region
(place of residence)
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Figure 14. Impacts of changes in passenger car taxation on overall road transport costs
(all fixed and variable taxable journey costs) in different income brackets by region
(place of residence).
Figure 15 describes the costs incurred by motorists according to how much they use their
car. Most households drive less than average, and therefore they would pay less tax
under the kilometre regime than they do under the current tax system. By contrast
households who drive a lot would have to pay more. This is a natural result of having a
system where the taxation of motoring is based exclusively on vehicle use.
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Figure 15. Impacts of changes in passenger car taxation by annual household car use in
different regions
Figure 16 describes the impacts of the different tax models on different types of
households. It seems that under the kilometre model, pensioners and other households
would have to pay less than under the current tax regime. The flat kilometre model
would slightly increase the motoring costs of families with children. Costs under the
regionally modulated kilometre model would seem to be similar to those under the
current tax system.
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Figure 16. Annual motoring costs under different tax models by type of household
7.2.1 Examples: specific vehicles
The discussion above has considered the impacts of introducing a kilometre tax system
from the point of view of road transport as a whole. However it is also interesting to
consider how the taxation of specific car makes and models would be affected.
It is necessary to observe that the kilometre tax is first and foremost a transport policy
tool, i.e. the tax rate can be set with specific transport policy objectives in mind. If the
aim is to reduce emission levels from road transport, greater weight should be given to
the emissions component of the kilometre tax; while if the main focus is on regional
regulation, then the emphasis is placed on the regional component. These are political
decisions.
The impacts of the kilometre tax are described for four different car makes, which differ
from one another in terms of prices, taxes and emissions. For simplicity the examination
is conducted for the present situation. The underlying assumptions of the calculations are
described in more detail in a separate Annex. The cars featuring in the example
calculations are Ford Focus 1.0 Eco Boost (price including tax 21 293 €, 109 g/km),
Toyota Avensis 1.8 (26 928 €, 152 g/km), Volvo Xc 60 5D (diesel, 55 294 €, 169 g/km)
and Nissan Qhasqai 1.6 L (20 890 €, 139 g/km).
The amount of car and vehicle tax payable varies depending on carbon dioxide
emissions. To maintain this element of environmental regulation, the kilometre tax must
also be based on emissions. The average kilometre tax is 3.3 cents per kilometre. In this
example the kilometre tax is set at a level that corresponds to the emissions-based
vehicle tax scale so that for vehicles with average carbon dioxide emissions of 160 g/km,
the kilometre tax is 3.3 cents per kilometre. The kilometre tax rate for a vehicle with
emissions of, say, 130 g/km would thus be 2.46 cents/km and for a vehicle with
emissions of 190 g/km 4.35 cents/km. There is no inherent reason why the tax scale
should be kept in line with existing scales, but it can be adjusted in various ways and
according to various objectives.
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Figure 17 provides an example to illustrate the difference between the existing tax
system and the kilometre tax system. The vehicle in this example is Nissan Qhasqai 1.6L.
As can be seen, the costs incurred by the motorist (taxes + fuel) under the kilometre tax
system are lower than in the current tax system so long as the car’s annual mileage is
less than 17,000 kilometres. If annual car use is more than 17,000 kilometres, the costs
incurred by the motorist will be higher than in the current system.
Figure 17. Annual driving costs (taxes + fuel) by kilometres driven under current tax
system and kilometre tax system, Nissan Qhasqai 1.6L
Figure 18 shows the differences between our example vehicles under the kilometre
system and the current tax regime for different annual mileages. In the cases of Ford
Focus 1.0 Eco Boost and Nissan Qhasqai, the amount of tax payable under the kilometre
system is smaller than under the existing system so long as the annual mileage is less
than 17,000 kilometres. For the Toyota, the corresponding mileage limit is 19,000 km.
The Volvo, on the other hand, differs clearly from this pattern in that the kilometre tax
would only be higher than the current tax after 30,000 kilometres a year. The reason for
this is that the car tax on the Volvo in question (15 594 €) is clearly higher than the car
taxes on the other example cars (3633 €, 6698 € and 4680 €). Car tax is based on the
value of the car and is therefore progressive: the higher the car’s pre-tax price, the
higher the car tax. For this reason the benefits of abandoning the car tax would
inevitably be the greatest for owners of the most expensive cars. On the other hand it
has to be borne in mind that the tax scale might be set differently to have different
impacts. Furthermore the tax authorities have at their disposal a variety of means with
which to offset tax effects if that is considered necessary.
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Figure 18. Differences in taxes payable by example cars under kilometre system and
current tax system according to annual kilometres driven
It is also possible to incorporate in this analysis the impacts of regional pricing. Tax rates
may be set at a lower level in regions where there are in practice no options to using a
car and at a higher level in areas that have a good public transport infrastructure. This is
taken into account in the example by using two different assumptions to calculate the
amount of annual tax revenue from the kilometre tax as compared to the current tax
regime. The kilometre tax in urban areas is assumed to be 20% higher than in densely
populated rural areas (averaging at 3.3 cents/km) and the tax in sparsely populated rural
areas is accordingly assumed to be 20% lower than the tax in densely populated rural
areas.
Furthermore two assumptions are made regarding the breakdown of kilometres driven in
different areas. The first assumes a high proportion of driving in urban areas (80%) as
compared to driving in densely (5%) and sparsely populated (15%) rural areas. The
second calculation works from the assumption of a high proportion of driving in sparsely
populated rural areas (80%) as compared to densely populated rural areas (5%) and
urban areas (15%). Figures 20–23 show the impacts of regional pricing on the use of the
example cars as compared to the current tax system. In this example for people who
drive a lot in rural areas the number of kilometres required for the kilometre tax rates to
become more expensive than the current tax regime is higher than for people driving a
lot in urban areas. Based on the pricing rates used in the example, the rural motorist
would pay the following amounts less if they drove 20,000 kilometres a year: in a Ford
Focus 1.0 Eco Boost 105 euros, in a Toyota Avensis 159 euros, in a Volvo Xc 60 D5 187
euros and in a Nissan Qashqai 140 euros.
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Figure 19. Impact of regional pricing compared to current tax system, Ford Focus 1.0 Eco
Boost
Figure 20. Impact of regional pricing compared to current tax system, Toyota Avensis 1,8
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Figure 21. Impact of regional pricing compared to current tax system, Volvo Xc 60 D5
Figure 22. Impact of regional pricing compared to current tax system, Nissan Qhasqai
1,6L
7.2.2 Summary of impact assessments
The kilometre tax is an instrument of economic regulation aimed at influencing the
choices and behaviours of passenger car users. It is clear from the impact assessments
above that the kilometre tax does what it is expected to do: motorists will change their
behaviour. Some will drive less, choose another route, use public transport for some
trips, buy a new car, etc. This in spite of the fact that overall, the amount of taxes levied
on passenger cars is exactly the same as in the current situation. The consequences of
behaviour changes are reflected in the reduced number of accidents and the reduced
level of emissions.
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The kilometre tax is most beneficial to motorists who drive less than average. Motorists
who drive more than average, on the other hand, will have to pay more, in line with the
user-pays principle. People buying more expensive cars will also benefit from the tax
reform as the discontinuation of the progressive car tax will have greatest impact at the
top end of the price scale.
In an overall assessment the introduction of a kilometre tax would not increase the
motoring costs of households or different population groups. There may, however, be
marked differences in individual cases, depending largely on such factors as the age of
the car.
7.3 Costs of payment systems
The following cost estimates of running different road pricing payment systems have
been compiled by RAPP Trans (Switzerland) together with Finnish traffic planning
consultants Traficon Oy. There is a separate report on these cost estimates, and
therefore only a brief discussion is given here. The main focus is on the costs of payment
systems to government.
Kilometre models
The costs of running a kilometre-based payment system are estimated for three different
alternatives. Under the first alternative the system only allows for the collection of the
kilometre tax. Under the second alternative it is assumed that private service providers
can also offer other services to road users; road pricing data is just one of these services
(multi-service model). These two alternatives support regionally differentiated pricing
systems (regional kilometre model). In the third alternative the same kilometre tax rate
is applied to all motorists throughout the country (kilometre tax model). This means
there is no need to know the location of the vehicle.
The Finnish Constitution says that a task involving significant exercise of public powers
can only be delegated to public authorities. The Constitutional Law Committee’s
interpretation is that taxation is just such a task. It follows that powers to levy taxes and
monitor the payment of taxes cannot be assigned to private companies. For this reason
implementation of a kilometre tax system would have to be charged to a public authority,
which in Finland would be the national road pricing operator. The road pricing operator
(RPO) would have responsibility for developing and maintaining the kilometre tax
system, collecting taxes, and for the rectification and supervision of taxation, including
the supervision of transport data service providers.
The road pricing operator would charge motorists for kilometres driven. The operator
would receive the necessary information either directly from the on-board unit installed
by the operator, or via an EETS service provider or via a private service provider (Figure
23).
In the regionally modulated kilometre tax model all Finnish-registered cars would be
required to have an on-board unit to register data on kilometres driven in each tariff
zone. In this model data on kilometres driven could be recorded not only from the OBU
but also the vehicle’s milometer.
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Figure 23. Outline description of kilometre tax system
Motorists will have three different ways of obtaining an on-board unit. First, they can sign
a contract with the road pricing operator, who will install the on-board unit in the vehicle.
The RPO would charge an annual fee for the OBU. Second, the motorist can sign a
contract with an EETS service provider or a private service provider. In these cases the
OBU will be provided and installed by the respective service provider.
The cost estimate is based on the assumption of an estimated OBU price of 100 euros in
2025. This is a relatively high figure because already OBUs are retailing at less than 150
euros. The high price may be justified by the fact that the OBU must be “strong”, i.e. it
must report any malfunctions and attempts to damage the unit. A strong OBU also
reduces the costs of supervision. Furthermore the price includes charges from OBU
installation.11
The OBU will be installed and serviced by the road pricing operator, who will charge an
annual rent. In practice, therefore, the motorist will pay for the OBU. The OBU will need
replacing after ten years. The RPO will therefore charge an estimated rent of 10–14
euros a year. The EETS operator will similarly charge a rent for the OBU, but the rent will
be lower than charged by the RPO. The private service provider’s business idea, then, is
based on using the same platform to provide additional services to the motorist other
than just kilometre readings. For this reason private service providers will be able to
charge less in rent than the RPO, or possibly even offer OBUs free of charge if the
motorist is interested in the additional services available.
11 By 2025 OBUs will probably be plug&drive devices with very low installation costs.
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7.3.1 Investment costs
The RPO’s investment costs break down into several items. These costs are shown in
Table 4.
ALT1 ALT2 ALT3
Project costs 8 11 8
IT-back office 25 25 25
Road data (digital maps) 5 5 0
OBUs plug&drive 50 50 0
Advance funding 2 0.5 2
Support and service
network 3 3 5
Payment system for foreign
registered vehicles (vignette) 5 5 5
Monitoring
equipment 31 31 40
Training + other 3.5 3.5 3.5
Total 132.5 134 88,5
OBUs    330
ALT1 = taxation only (regional pricing)
ALT2 = multi-service model (regional pricing)
ALT3 = kilometre tax model (flat rate)
Table 4. RPO investment costs for kilometre tax payment system, EUR million
The set-up of a road pricing system involves certain administrative costs (project costs),
such as legal services, contracts, IT licences etc. In alternatives 1 and 3 these costs
come to around EUR 8 million. The multi-service model involves signing a larger number
of contracts and therefore project costs are slightly higher than in the other two
alternatives, i.e. EUR 11 million. IT infrastructure costs are the same in all three
alternatives at around EUR 25 million. This will also cover investment costs in the tax
system (data exchange and storage, customer register, tax collection, ledger, collection
of receivables, monitoring).
To ensure that taxation is equitable and to discourage people from registering cars in
other countries, it is necessary to collect taxes from foreign-registered cars as well. A
separate payment system is needed for foreign-registered cars. It is not feasible to
require that foreign vehicles arriving in Finland are fitted with an OBU. One way of taxing
foreign motorists would be to make OBUs available for rent, against a deposit, at border
crossing-points. This would only be possible with plug&drive units. Some foreign
motorists might prefer to choose a time-based vignette fee for a maximum of, say, 10
days. This would entail creating two separate tax and monitoring systems for foreign-
registered vehicles. This additional cost is reflected in the cost estimate. Motorists who
already have a contract with an EETS operator would not have to obtain an OBU or
purchase a vignette, as their existing OBU would be compatible with the Finnish system.
The cost of OBUs needed for foreign-registered vehicles would be in the region of EUR 50
million in the case of GPS-based systems. In the kilometre alternative no OBUs are
needed because the kilometres driven by foreign motorists would be checked at border
crossing points insofar as that is possible under internal market rules. In all alternatives
the investment costs for the vignette system needed for foreign motorists is EUR 5
million.
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Setting up a monitoring system represents another significant cost item. A national
monitoring system would be designed around fixed monitoring points (gates) and mobile
monitoring units. In the GPS alternatives the monitoring investment costs are EUR 31
million. The kilometre model requires more roadside monitoring than the other
alternatives, which is why investment costs in monitoring (EUR 40 million) are higher
than in the other alternatives.
The costs to the RPO from setting up a road pricing system are almost the same in
alternative 1 and the multi-service model, i.e. EUR 132.5 and 134 million, respectively.
The investment costs in the kilometre tax model are 88.5 million euros. The difference
compared to the other alternatives is explained by the fact that in this case it is not
necessary to obtain OBUs for foreign-registered vehicles.
OBUs obviously represent a major cost item. In 2025 there would be need for some 3.3
million OBUs. OBU investment costs would therefore come to EUR 330 million. However
this is not included in the RPO’s investment costs because the cost would be covered by
motorists. Furthermore the number of OBUs supplied by the RPO varies in different
alternatives. In connection with the launch of the system the costs of installing OBUs in
the entire vehicle fleet would come to an estimated EUR 330 million. Replacing these
units at least once every ten years would entail an additional cost of the same
magnitude. Changes in the OBU model used or in contract partners in connection with
car ownership changes might also entail additional costs; this may happen several times
during the vehicle’s lifespan. Today the annual number of car ownership changes in
Finland is around 600,000.
In alternative 1 where OBUs are used for taxation purposes only, most of the investment
burden rests with the RPO. It is estimated that the RPO would purchase 95% of all OBUs
and EETS operators the remaining 5%. In the multi-service model, then, the assumption
is that private service providers would supply 80% of the units, EETS operators 5% and
the RPO 15%. In the kilometre tax model the RPO is responsible for providing the OBU,
but the number of OBU users is only 500,000. Other motorists are expected to have
readings taken from their milometer.
The RPO will supply and deliver OBUs to motorists, and therefore the costs from OBU
installation, financing etc. are taken into account in the RPO’s annual operating costs.
7.3.2 Operating costs
Annual operating and maintenance costs from the kilometre tax payment system consist
of administrative expenditure, the acquisition of new OBUs, customer service, invoicing,
customer information, the collection of fees from foreign motorists, servicing,
remunerations to other service providers, monitoring including the monitoring and
sanctioning of service providers, safeguarding the legal protection of persons liable to tax
and depreciations,
The major cost items arise from the invoicing and monitoring of domestic and foreign
motorists. Table 5 shows the annual costs of different charging systems.
The annual costs in alternative 1 are EUR 133 million (including depreciations). The
annual costs from the multi-service models are slightly lower at EUR 126 million, and
from the kilometre model EUR 116 million.
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EUR million
ALT1 ALT2 ALT3
RPO administration, IT, customer
information, etc. 9 9 6
OBUs admin, new,
handling 10 9 1
Collection of charges domestic 53 38 53
Collection of charges
foreign 20 20 18
Support and servicing
network 1 1 1
Supervision personnel costs + new
equipment 26 26 26
Others 1 1 1
Compensation to EETS
operators
 - domestic 2 2 2
 - foreign 1 1 1
Compensation to private service
providers
 - domestic 0 7 0
Total 121 114 109
Depreciations 12 12 8
Total 133 126 116
Table 5. Annual operating and maintenance costs of kilometre tax payment systems, EUR
million, introduction in 2025
Annual operating and maintenance costs do not differ significantly between the different
models. This is mainly because the volume of traffic and number of cars are largely the
same under each system. The differences could be significantly greater and the costs
much lower if legislation permitted EETS service providers and especially private service
providers to collect road pricing charges and to invoice customers.
7.3.3  Assessing the costs: how much is much?
Are  the  above  costs  of  running  a  road  pricing  system  high,  reasonable  or  low?  The
answer obviously depends on what these costs are compared with.
The  cost  effectiveness  of  taxation  is  usually  measured  by  comparing  the  costs  of  tax
collection with the revenue from the tax in question. The current system of road taxation
is highly cost effective. The costs of collecting fuel tax are no more than 0.01% of fuel
tax  revenue.  Car  tax  is  collected  by  Finnish  Customs,  which  reports  annual  collection
costs of less than EUR 5 million or some 0.5% of car tax revenue. Customs is in the
process of upgrading its information systems, and it is anticipated that the costs from
collecting car tax will fall further to some EUR 2 million a year.
The Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi is tasked with collecting the annual vehicle tax
and motive force tax. Annual costs come to around EUR 11 million or 1.2% of vehicle tax
revenue. HGV traffic accounts for some 15% of these costs, which means that the share
of passenger cars and vans is some EUR 9 million a year.
In 2025 the kilometre system would generate tax revenue of around EUR 2.0 billion. The
annual costs of collecting the kilometre tax under the three alternatives above (6.7 %,
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6.3  %  and  5.8  %)  would  therefore  be  much  higher  than  in  the  existing  system.
Increasing traffic volumes will obviously generate more tax revenue and reduce the
relative share of collection costs, since those costs will not increase accordingly. However
the  collection  costs  would  be  very  reasonable  if  compared  with  existing  road  pricing
schemes.
However the savings from the kilometre tax system in reduced accidents and emissions
are somewhat higher (depending on the regional modulation) than the system’s annual
operating costs (Table 6). The benefits in public finances terms, therefore, are equal to
the annual costs of operating the road pricing system.
Kilometre model
(flat rate)
Regional tariffs
(modulation 1)
Regional tariffs
(modulation 2)
Operating costs    -133    -126    -126
Reduced costs from
accidents
    129       94     121
Reduced emissions costs      11        8       10
Savings to public finances
total
       7     -24        5
Table  6.  Annual  operating  costs  of  road  pricing  systems  and  the  savings  in  reduced
accidents and emissions from the kilometre models as compared to the current tax
system, EUR million
To gain a rough idea of the cost burden of the kilometre tax system to public finances it
is useful to look more closely at central government revenue and expenditure. One
difference between the kilometre system and the existing tax regime is that under the
kilometre model, tax revenue would also be received from foreign-registered vehicles on
Finnish roads. This is not the case with the existing car tax and annual vehicle tax.
Revenue is generated, by contrast, from fuel tax, as foreign-registered vehicles arriving
in Finland are only permitted to bring in as much fuel as they can carry in their fuel tank
plus a 10-litre reserve tank. However the fuel tax is the same in all three alternatives, so
they do not differ from each other in this respect.
Today, the annual number of cross-border car trips into and out of Finland is around 6.5
million.  Foreign-registered vehicles account for  around 80% of this.  It  is  projected that
cross-border  traffic  will  rise  sharply  in  the  future.  If  visa  requirements  are  lifted  for
Russian  tourists,  for  instance,  the  influx  of  Russian  passenger  cars  would  certainly
increase. In 2025 it is estimated that the number of cars crossing Finnish borders will be
close to 10 million a year, with foreign-registered vehicles accounting for 70%.
It is thought that the majority of foreign vehicles would opt for the vignette payment,
which is a simpler solution than an OBU. Tax revenue from foreign-registered vehicles in
2025 is estimated at EUR 80 million. A number of factors obviously combine to influence
the number of foreign cars on Finnish roads. Annual kilometre tax revenue from foreign
motorists in Finland would probably be in the region of EUR 50–100 million.
The annual net costs of running a kilometre road pricing scheme to central government,
counting only the tax revenue generated and the costs of collecting the tax from both
domestic and foreign motorists, would be around EUR 53 million, EUR 46 million and EUR
36 million, respectively. The cost savings from the reduced collection costs under the
current tax system would reduce these figures somewhat. Therefore the immediate costs
from the kilometre tax system would not be very high.
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8. Working Group’s conclusions
The continuing growth of road traffic, increasingly rigorous environmental standards and
the current state of public finances all underscore the need for more effective transport
policy. Economic regulation is an effective way of steering and controlling transport. The
growing wave of digitalisation that has swept most sectors of society in recent years is
inevitably going to make a major impact on transport as well.
Advancing technology and the growth of smart transport solutions provide an opportunity
to move towards a fairer system of road transport taxation that is based on vehicle use.
At the same time the improving fuel efficiency of modern cars and the growing number of
electric cars mean that the system of motoring taxation will have to be updated in any
case so as to ensure stable tax revenues.
The Working Group agrees that in this situation it is advisable to align and
integrate transport policy objectives with the objectives of road transport
taxation.
A more effective achievement of transport policy objectives would require a tax regime in
which taxes are based more on how much drivers use their cars. This is consistent with
EU transport policy objectives. In practice one way of moving in this direction would be
to substitute fixed taxes (the motor car tax and annual vehicle tax) with taxes based on
kilometres driven.
The kilometre tax would be a more flexible transport policy tool than the current tax
system in that it can be adjusted depending on time, place and type of vehicle, within the
bounds of equal treatment of citizens. The relative weight placed on these factors could
be varied according to shifting transport policy emphases and priorities, such as reducing
emission levels or targeting local transport costs.
The available evidence suggests that a tax model based exclusively on vehicle use, i.e. a
kilometre tax coupled with fuel tax, would better serve the achievement of transport and
environmental policy objectives than the existing tax regime. It would reduce passenger
car use, emission levels and road accidents and increase the use of public transport.
Furthermore the kilometre tax would contribute to a denser community structure.
The collection of a kilometre tax would require a technically far more sophisticated and
expensive system than the current tax collection methods. The annual costs of
implementing the kilometre tax would be in the region of EUR 120–130 million. This
comes in at around 6.5% of annual tax revenue, a significantly higher figure than
currently. In other words the kilometre-based system would be less cost effective than
the existing method. However the annual savings from the kilometre tax in reduced
accident and emission costs to society would be equal to the costs of collecting the
kilometre tax. Furthermore the additional costs incurred to government would be offset
by the tax revenue gained from the inclusion in the tax regime of foreign-registered
vehicles driving on Finnish roads.
An overhaul of the road tax system that would make the amount of tax payable entirely
dependent on car use would affect the costs incurred to drivers. The basic principle is
that a tax system based on kilometres driven would mean that people who drive less
than average would have to pay less, while those who drive more than average would
have to pay more. Again, the magnitude of the impact depends largely on the vehicle
(age and air pollution emissions).
The analyses conducted showed that, on average, the kilometre tax would not
significantly affect the amount of tax paid in different income bands or households.
However there might be marked interindividual differences.
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The kilometre tax has the potential to affect transport costs in different regions. However
it is paramount that regional tax rates and charges based on vehicle emissions are
carefully aligned so that there are no conflicts or contradictions. The Working Group has
made no attempt to develop an optimal pricing scheme that would best serve the overall
policy objectives. This issue comes down to political choices and to which factors are to
be given the greatest weight. Therefore the unit prices used by the Working Group are
not intended as proposals for actual kilometre tax units, but merely serve the purpose of
describing the relative effects of different weights.
The Working Group takes the view that the estimated impact of taxing drivers
based on kilometres driven lends support to a possible move in motoring
taxation towards the introduction of a kilometre tax in Finland.
Existing national and EU legislation pose no obstacles to the development of a national
road pricing system. There are, however, several significant legislative boundary
conditions for the implementation of such a system. Privacy protection is just one of the
considerations that must be resolved from the very outset in developing a kilometre-
based tax system. The default idea is that data on vehicle use shall be exclusively
accessible to, but not modifiable by, the owner or keeper of the vehicle so that the data
necessary for the determination of the tax or the amount of tax due is passed in correct
time to the tax authorities. The authorities would only be allowed to request more
detailed information on the use of the vehicle in special cases provided for in the
applicable legislation.
The Working Group takes the view that privacy protection is a fundamental
precondition for the introduction of a kilometre tax system.
Overhauling the motoring tax system to make the amount of tax payable entirely
dependent on car use is a major public issue that involves a number of challenges and
uncertainties, such as the question of what stages are needed to see this change
through.
One key challenge stems from the discontinuation of the existing tax system. For the
kilometre tax to have sufficient powers of economic regulation, the unit price needs to be
sufficiently high. Replacing the annual vehicle tax with a kilometre tax would be relatively
simple and straightforward and would have very little impact on the automotive market.
However in this case the unit price of the kilometre-based tax would not be very high and
therefore the impact would also remain quite marginal. For this reason it is necessary to
also replace the motor car tax, currently the main source of fixed tax revenue, with the
kilometre tax. This in turn means that the kilometre tax should be applicable to all
passenger cars, both old and new. However the biggest challenge has to do with how the
motor car tax can be discontinued in such a manner that the effects on the automotive
market, for instance, can be easily predicted and controlled. The Working Group has not
looked into the question of how this change could be implemented and what kinds of
effects it would have.
There are several uncertainties with the technology. A kilometre-based tax system
should most ideally be based on a multi-service concept in which individual service
providers would largely cover the costs from on-board units, for instance. This
arrangement would only be viable if extensive services other than kilometre tax data
collection were in place and if the necessary on-board units were in widespread use
before the introduction of the kilometre tax.
The Working Group considers it important that before any final decisions on the
adoption of a kilometre tax are taken, it is crucial to ensure that the necessary
technology works as intended and that it is suited to taxation purposes; that the
cost estimates are accurate; and that privacy protection is maintained.
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For this reason the Working Group recommends a step-by-step approach
through trials and experiments. The first stage should involve extensive testing
of technical systems, information security and monitoring methods.
The Working Group has considered the viability and effects of a kilometre tax in a 2025
scenario, basing its assessments on certain assumptions regarding the removal or
modification of existing taxes, even though no decisions have been made to that effect.
The Working Group expresses no view on the question of when the kilometre-based tax
system should be introduced, because the decision on implementing such a system is a
political one.
International experiences have shown that the introduction of road pricing systems has
generated and accelerated related business opportunities. If Finland were to adopt a
positioning-based transport tax system that makes use of the multi-service concept, that
would probably generate new competence in this area as well as create new jobs in
Finland.
The Working Group is keen to stress that the early introduction of a kilometre-
based tax would contribute to create new business opportunities and jobs in
Finnish industry.
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Annex	1	
	
SUPPLEMENTARY	OPINION	 	 	 13	Dec	2013	The	Working	Group	has	made	the	recommendation	that	transport	policy	objectives	be	integrated	and	aligned	with	the	objectives	of	road	taxation,	and	suggests	that	the	estimated	impacts	of	taxing	drivers	based	on	kilometres	lend	support	to	a	possible	move	in	road	taxation	towards	the	introduction	of	a	kilometre	tax	in	Finland.	The	Working	Group	has	particularly	focused	on	the	grounds	and	reasons	for	moving	from	the	current	system	of	car	and	vehicle	taxation	to	a	kilometre	tax	based	on	GPS	monitoring	of	vehicles.	In	my	capacity	as	representative	for	the	Ministry	of	Finance	I	should	like	to	offer	the	following	viewpoints	regarding	the	viability,	costs	and	impacts	of	the	tax	model	in	view	of	the	possible	further	preparation	of	this	matter.	Taxes	are	levied	first	and	foremost	for	reasons	of	public	finance.	Sound	tax	policy	is	about	creating	and	operating	a	cost-efficient,	neutral	and	fair	tax	system.	Taxes	must	be	cost	effective:	the	costs	of	tax	collection	and	tax	control	must	be	kept	to	a	minimum.	The	kilometre	tax	would	be	an	entirely	new	type	of	tax.	Existing	commercial	applications	based	on	smart	services	or	GPS	technology	have	not	been	designed	for	purposes	of	tax	collection.	No	country	has	in	place	a	comprehensive	kilometre	tax	system	for	passenger	cars,	and	therefore	there	are	no	international	experiences	of	how	these	systems	work	or	how	much	they	cost.	By	way	of	comparison,	the	costs	of	such	a	system	in	the	Netherlands,	where	planning	has	reached	a	far	more	advanced	stage,	have	been	estimated	at	over	five	billion	euros.	Investment	costs	were	estimated	at	EUR	3.6	billion	and	operating	costs	in	2012–2016	at	EUR	2.1	billion.	It	is	difficult	at	this	early	stage	to	assess	the	accuracy	and	robustness	of	the	Working	Group’s	cost	calculations	and	the	possible	revenue	risks	in	the	tax	model,	since	it	is	not	year	clear	how	the	model	will	be	implemented	and	how	effectively	it	will	work.	The	Finnish	Constitution	stipulates	that	all	powers	of	taxation	are	vested	in	public	authorities,	and	therefore	data	on	vehicle	transport	use	and	individualised	data	on	taxable	persons	must	be	available	for	purposes	of	taxation,	tax	control	and	tax	correction	processes	for	several	years.	This	raises	questions	about	the	viability	of	the	privacy	protection	model	discussed	by	the	Working	Group	where	transport	data	are	exclusively	accessible	to	the	motorist	or	to	some	other	private	party.	The	volume	of	data	concerned	is	considerable	and	the	collection	of	taxes	based	on	that	data	an	administratively	cumbersome	task,	even	if	the	tax	were	to	be	levied	in	the	same	way	as	the	existing	vehicle	tax	for	specified	time	periods.	Changes	in	the	registered	owner	or	keeper	of	the	vehicle	would	further	add	to	the	administrative	burden.	Watertight	tax	control	is	crucial	to	an	effective	tax	regime	and	to	ensuring	that	motorsists	receive	equal	and	fair	treatment.	Control	should	extend	from	the	installation	of	on-board	units	and	making	sure	they	work	properly	through	the	prevention	of	misuse	to	ensuring	that	service	providers	meet	their	legal	and	contractual	obligations.	In	an	EETS	based	tax	system	there	might	be	several	service	providers,	which	would	probably	include	foreign-based	operators.	As	yet	there	is	no	experience	of	setting	up	such	control	and	monitoring	mechanisms.	
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Cost	calculations	for	setting	up	the	system	must	also	include	the	on-board	units	and	the	costs	from	their	installation,	as	well	as	the	costs	incurred	to	the	service	provider	from	the	collection	of	transport	data,	regardless	of	who	is	going	to	pay	those	costs.	Further	costs	may	arise	from	the	possible	need	to	update	equipment	and	to	rewrite	service	contracts	in	connection	with	car	ownership	changes,	which	happen	around	600,000	times	a	year.	Cars	usually	have	several	owners	during	their	lifespan.	Furthermore,	it	needs	to	be	pointed	out	that	in	an	EETS	compatible	kilometre	tax	system	the	tax	authorities	have	no	say	over	how	much	motorists	have	to	pay	for	their	on-board	units	or	under	their	contract	with	a	service	provider:	this	will	be	determined	in	what	may	be	a	competitive	marketplace.	The	commercial	services	offered	to	motorists	in	the	so-called	multi-service	model	may	be	a	competitive	asset	to	the	service	provider	and	help	to	lower	the	hardware	and	service	costs,	but	not	all	motorists	will	necessarily	need	or	want	them.	People	liable	to	pay	tax	may	find	themselves	in	a	situation	where		they	do	not	know	how	much	tax	or	incidental	costs	they	are	going	to	have	to	pay.	The	taxation	of	foreign-registered	vehicles	presents	a	major	challenge	in	the	EU	internal	market	because	of	the	prohibition	of	border	formalities	and	tax	discrimination,	and	would	be	a	major	source	of	additional	costs.	Finland	would	be	able	to	levy	taxes	on	vehicles	equipped	with	OBUs	once	it	receives	the	relevant	data	and	the	motorist’s		address	from	the	foreign	service	provider.	However	the	tax	authorities	might	often	have	to	recover	unpaid	taxes	from	abroad,	which	is	notoriously	difficult.	This	would	further	add	to	the	administrative	burden	of	the	tax	system,	significantly	driving	up	its	costs	relative	to	the	amount	of	tax	revenue.	In	addition,	other	foreign-registered	vehicles	would	have	to	be	taxed	in	some	other	way.	The	model	proposed	by	the	Working	Group	where	motorists	could	choose	between	a	kilometre	tax	by	using	a	hired	OBU	or	a	time-based	vignette	fee	would	imply	creating	two	separate	tax	and	control	systems	for	foreign-registered	vehicles,	which	again	would	drive	up	overall	costs.	It	is	unclear	how	much	revenue	would	be	generated	from	taxing	foreign-registered	vehicles,	and	the	concept	is	questionable	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	equitable	treatment	of	motorists.	Closer	investigation	is	needed	to	ascertain	the	comptability	of	the	tax	models	with	the	internal	market	principle	of	free	movement.	In	the	further	development	of	this	project	it	is	necessary	first	of	all	to	establish	what	would	be	the	most	appropriate	approach	to	implementing	the	tax	model.	On	this	basis	it	needs	to	be	assessed	whether	the	cost	calculations	are	realistic	in	view	of	the	distinctive	character	of	Finnish	tax	practice.	It	is	clear	even	from	the	Working	Group’s	own	calculations	that	the	investment	and	operating	costs	would	be	significantly	higher	than	those	of	the	existing	road	tax	system,	which	are	around	0.2%	of	overall	tax	revenue.	The	Working	Group	points	out	that	the	kilometre	tax	will	bring	important	social	benefits	through	reduced	congestion	on	the	roads	and	fewer	road	accidents.	Future	work	needs	to	assess	to	what	extent	these	benefits	could	and	will	be	achieved	through	the	proliferation	of	other	smart,	GPS-based	services	that	help	drivers	avoid	congested	roads,	for	instance,	a	trend	that	is	thought	will	inevitably	continue.		A	closer	assessment	is	also	needed	of	environmental	impacts.	The	existing	car	tax	encourages	consumers	to	buy	low-emission	vehicles	because	the	amount	of	car	tax	payable	is	dependent	on	the	vehicle’s	CO2	emissions,	which	have	a	transparent	effect	on	the	consumer	price.	As	the	Working	Group	points	out,	this	regulatory	effect	would	be	
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lost	with	the	removal	of	the	car	tax,	which	would	make	more	expensive	and	higher	emissions	cars	in	particular	more	attractive.	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	kilometre	tax	and	its	carbon	dioxide	component	would	be	enough	to	counter	the	effects	of	this	shift	on	overall	emissions	levels.	Even	though	the	removal	of	the	car	tax	would	reduce	the	consumer	prices	of	some	cars,	it	would	still	not	be	possible	for	everyone	to	buy	a	new	car.	A	possible	reduction	in	the	price	of	new	cars	would	probably	lower	the	value	of	used	cars	on	the	domestic	market.	In	all	likelihood	the	removal	of	the	car	tax	would	increase	the	pre-tax	prices	of	new	cars	to	the	same	level	as	in	countries	that	do	not	have	a	car	tax.	The	burden	from	the	current	car	tax	is	carried	by	foreign	manufacturers	and	only	in	part	by	consumers,	as	international	price	comparisons	show	that	the	supply	side	pays	for	the	bulk	of	Finland’s	car	tax.	The	socio-economic	impacts	of	the	kilometre	tax	and	its	effects	on	income	distribution	need	to	be	examined	in	more	detail	than	just	averages,	which	distort	the	effects	of	the	current	car	tax	on	cars	of	different	ages,	for	instance:	the	amount	of	tax	as	a	proportion	of	the	value	of	the	car	decreases	with	increase	age.	The	amount	of	car	tax	as	a	proportion	of	overall	road	taxes	is	highest	in	cars	that	are	less	than	7	years	old,	whereas	in	older	cars	the	current	fuel	tax,	which	is	based	purely	on	vehicle	use,	already	represents	the	single	biggest	tax	cost.	In	other	words	abandoning	the	car	tax	and	introducing	a	kilometre	tax	would	have	differential	effects	on	the	tax	burden	placed	on	different	types	of	cars.	Furthermore,	given	that	it	is	directly	dependent	on	consumer	prices,	the	car	tax	can	be	considered	a	form	of	progressive	taxation	which	takes	account	of	the	willingness	and	ability	of	car	owners	to	pay	tax.	Even	a	regionally	differentiated	kilometre	tax	regime	would	not	achieve	the	same	effect.	On	the	other	hand,	if	a	regionally	differentiated	tax	system	is	a	politically	driven	objective,	then	it	is	possible	to	develop	the	existing	system	in	this	direction	because	the	time-based	vehicle	tax	can	at	reasonable	cost	be	modified	for	regional	modulation	within	the	bounds	of	equal	treatment	of	citizens.	Further	assessments	are	also	needed	of	the	impacts	of	a	kilometre	tax	on	labour	mobility	or	economic	activity,	for	instance.	Taxation	is	effective	when	it	does	not	distort	the	choices	of	households	or	businesses,	and	when	it	is	not	dependent	on	the	taxable	person’s	own	actions.	Under	a	kilometre-based	tax	system	taxable	persons	would	be	able	to	directly	influence	the	amount	of	taxes	they	have	to	pay,	which	would	undermine	the	efficiency	of	the	economy	as	well	as	economic	activity.		Merja	Sandell	Ministry	of	Finance	
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ANNEX 2.
Background assumptions for example calculations
Ford Focus
1,0 Eco Boost
Toyota
Avensis 1,8
Volvo Xc 60
D5
Nissan
Qhasqai 1,6L
CO2
emissions
g/km
  109   152   169   139
Consumption
l/100km
  4.7   6.5   6.4   6.2
Car tax euros  3633  6698 15594  4680
Price
including tax
euros
21293 26928 55294 20890
Vehicle tax
euros
 92.3  137.2 682.9 121.2
Km tax
cents/km
 2.021  3.0567 3.593 2.685
Fuel
cents/km
 7.52 10.4 9.40 9.92
Motive force
tax cents/km
     0      0      2     0
Car tax per
year (15 yrs)
euros
  242   447   1040   312
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Petrol price including tax 1.6 euros/litre
Diesel price including tax 1.47 euros/litre
CO2/km Km tax
100 1.77
105 1.94
110 2.04
115 2.14
120 2.24
125 2.35
130 2.46
135 2.59
140 2.71
145 2.85
150 3.00
155 3.15
160 3.30
165 3.46
170 3.63
175 3.80
180 3.98
185 4.16
190 4.36
195 4.56
200 4.77
